Elections in Ghana: A Deadly Game of Russian Roulette; The Result of the Electoral Commission’s Abdication of Accountability and Responsibility for Security

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By Alolga Akata-Pore – Ex soldier and cybersecurity researcher

The distinction between accountability and responsibility is foundational in governance, particularly within institutions entrusted with managing critical national processes such as elections. Yet, Ghana’s Electoral Commission (EC) has repeatedly blurred this line, adopting contradictory stances that undermine its credibility and public trust. While the EC defends its independence in some matters, it paradoxically deflects responsibility in others, particularly in ensuring electoral security. This inconsistency calls for a deeper examination of the EC’s claims and actions.

Constitutional Independence and the EC’s Role in Security
The Ghanaian Constitution does not explicitly specify responsibilities for election security. However, discerning Ghanaians may take the view that the EC, in using this absence as an excuse to abdicate accountability, is both flawed and disingenuous. Every single task within the electoral process assumes the security of the citizen as a foundational element. For example, while the Constitution does not explicitly state that officers and suppliers engaged by the EC must be security vetted, the implicit assumption is that the EC ensures such vetting occurs to protect the integrity of the process.

In great wisdom, the Constitution is replete with references to Probity and Accountability, emphasizing their foundational importance in governance. Article 35(8) expects public officers to promote these principles in all decisions and actions. For an institution as critical as the EC, accountability must extend to all aspects of the electoral process, including security. Probity demands transparency and diligence in safeguarding the interests of citizens, while Accountability ensures that those tasked with responsibilities uphold the trust placed in them.

The EC’s independence is enshrined in Article 46 of Ghana’s 1992 Constitution, granting it the autonomy to manage electoral processes without interference. This includes decisions on the location of polling stations, the recruitment of election officers, and the scheduling of elections. These responsibilities inherently carry accountability for the outcomes of such decisions, including the safety and integrity of the electoral process. The EC cannot claim independence while simultaneously disclaiming responsibility for electoral security.

Consider this: Would the National Security Council, which has overarching responsibility for national security, be allowed to decide where polling stations are located, those who are recruited as election officers, where the EC holds its meetings, who is allowed at collation centres, or which printing houses are contracted? The answer is unequivocally no. The EC fiercely guards these decisions, which impinge on the security of the elections, as its exclusive mandate.

How then can it claim that ensuring security during elections is not part of its responsibilities? Independence and accountability are inseparable; one cannot exist without the other.

Contradictions in the EC’s Public Statements and Actions
The EC’s inconsistency extends to its handling of security for its officials and premises. In recent times, the EC has reportedly ‘beefed up’ security around its buildings and the residences of senior officials. The head of the EC is also said to have been assigned a military bodyguard who doubles up as military orderly.
This raises critical questions:
1. Decision-Making Authority: Who decided to enhance security for the EC and its officials? Was this initiated by the EC itself, or was it directed by another institution, such as the National Security Council?
2. Mandate and Accountability: If the EC can advocate for and implement heightened security for its facilities and personnel, why does it disclaim responsibility for the safety of voters and polling stations during elections? This selective application of responsibility undermines the Commission’s credibility.
3. Public Perception: Ensuring its own safety while appearing less proactive in addressing security risks that affect voters and election workers sends a troubling message. It suggests a prioritization of the EC’s institutional interests over the broader mandate of protecting the integrity and safety of the electoral process.
The EC’s inconsistency becomes even more glaring when we examine its public statements and actions during and after elections:
1. Calling on a President-Elect to Intervene in Violence: A few days after declaring election results, the EC publicly called on the then president-elect to intervene and stop reported acts of violence against some institutions. This raises critical questions:

What constitutional mandate allows a president-elect, not yet sworn into office to take responsibility for addressing violence?

Why would the EC abdicate its own role in coordinating with security agencies to address such issues?
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Taking Actions on Violent Crimes: The EC has also publicly claimed that some of its staff were threatened with violence, including incidents involving firearms and machetes. In response, the Commission ordered recounts or re-collations of ballots based on its own investigations into violent crimes.

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Why does the EC seem more concerned about the security of its staff than that of voters or polling agents, who are equally, if not more, vulnerable during elections?
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If the EC can independently investigate violent incidents and take consequential actions to protect its staff, why does it not extend the same urgency and accountability to the broader electorate?
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This selective approach to responsibility raises questions about the EC’s consistency in governance and its broader commitment to safeguarding the democratic process for all stakeholders.
Accountability and Responsibility in Public Sector Governance
Although the Constitution does not explicitly assign procurement responsibilities to the EC, it is implicit that the Commission oversees procurement activities to support its mandate. The EC has consistently taken responsibility and accountability for procurement processes, ensuring transparency in the selection of suppliers for election-related materials such as ballot papers and IT systems. So, it is worth examining why the EC easily assumes responsibility for procurement but appears less inclined to take ownership of election security. Both are essential components of its broader mandate to deliver credible elections.
Globally, best practices in public sector governance emphasize the clear distinction between accountability and responsibility. Accountability refers to the ultimate ownership and oversight of a process, ensuring its success and alignment with overarching objectives. Responsibility, on the other hand, involves the execution of specific tasks assigned by the accountable entity.
In Ghana’s electoral context:
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The Electoral Commission (EC) is the accountable entity, overseeing the electoral process and bearing ultimate responsibility for its success or failure. This includes managing critical aspects such as IT systems, voter data security, and election security.
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Security agencies, IT providers, and election officers are responsible parties, tasked with implementing specific components of the electoral process under the EC’s directives.
This distinction is crucial. For example, while the EC delegates the maintenance of law and order to security agencies, it cannot abdicate accountability for ensuring that all necessary measures are in place to secure polling stations and protect voters. Similarly, while IT providers manage technical infrastructure, the EC is accountable for ensuring the cybersecurity hygiene of its systems.

It appears, however, that the EC’s failure to take cybersecurity seriously stems from a belief that IT security is not its responsibility. This belief may explain why there are vulnerabilities littered across its systems, such as exposed voter data, and unprotected applications. Such lapses suggest a lack of commitment to the less glamorous but essential tasks required to maintain trust in the electoral process. The EC’s priorities seem disproportionately focused on high-profile activities like award ceremonies and the declaration of election results, rather than the critical behind-the-scenes work that ensures credibility and security.

Implications for Electoral Integrity and Public Trust
The Electoral Commission’s failure to take responsibility for security during elections has effectively advised voters that their safety is in their own hands. By inviting citizens to participate in an event without guaranteeing their security, the EC has virtually turned Ghana’s electoral process into a dangerous game of Russian Roulette, exposing participants to significant risks. This abdication of accountability creates a climate of fear and uncertainty.

The tragic consequences of this approach have been evident in recent elections. In 2019, 2020, and 2024, Ghana witnessed violent incidents at polling stations, resulting in the loss of lives. The 2020 and 2024 elections witnessed several fatalities attributed to clashes and violent disruptions. This trend not only underscores the human cost of electoral mismanagement but also highlights a broader erosion of public trust in the electoral process.

The reported drop in voter turnout in the last elections could partly be attributed to this reluctance among citizens to engage in what feels like a life-threatening gamble. For instance, voter turnout fell from 79% in 2020 to 63.9% in 2024, a decline of over 15 percentage points. Voters may have chosen to stay away from polling stations, not out of apathy or the lack of awareness of a well-publicised election, but out of a justified fear for their safety in an environment where the EC has failed to guarantee basic protections. Ghanaians are beginning to realize that since 2019, the EC has inadvertently subjected them to a deadly game of Russian Roulette at every election, often without the awareness of participants. This erosion of trust and participation strikes at the very heart of democracy and highlights the urgent need for reform.

Conclusion: Embracing Accountability for a Stable Democracy
The EC’s independence is an honour, a privilege but also a responsibility. To safeguard Ghana’s democracy, the Commission must embrace its accountability for all aspects of the electoral process, including security. Calling on external entities, such as a president-elect, to assume responsibilities that constitutionally rest with the EC only highlights its governance failures.

Ghana’s electoral process cannot afford this level of inconsistency. The EC must provide clear leadership and accountability to restore public trust and ensure that future elections are not marred by violence or systemic failures. Independence without accountability is a hollow privilege and the EC must rise to meet the full breadth of its constitutional mandate.