Ghana’s proposed security accord offers a way across West Africa’s political divide. Whether it can protect communities and trade routes is another matter, writes Jon Offei-Ansah
Keypoints:
- Ghana wants a coalition to counter Sahel militancy
- Bilateral cooperation is advancing despite political divisions
- Membership, funding and accountability remain unresolved
GHANA’S President John Dramani Mahama has put a new security idea on the table: bring the military-led Sahel states and their coastal neighbours into a practical alliance against militant violence, even while West Africa’s political rift remains unresolved.
The proposed Sahel-Gulf of Guinea Accord matters because armed groups, traders and displaced families cannot wait for regional diplomacy to catch up. It also raises an awkward question: can governments that disagree over legitimacy and foreign alliances agree on something as sensitive as intelligence and joint operations?
A divided region, a shared danger
At the Tana Forum in Ethiopia on October 24, Mahama described the accord as a coalition of willing countries, using bilateral, smaller-group and wider regional cooperation. He said the Accra Initiative, established to contain violent extremism, appeared to have stalled. Mahama said, ‘the Accra Initiative seems to have run aground.’
This was not a sudden announcement. At the Financial Times Africa Summit in London on October 21, Mahama had already called for a replacement framework. Tana gave the ambition a clearer name and political setting. The difference between announcing an accord and persuading states to implement it, however, remains enormous.
The difficulty begins with the map. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger left ECOWAS in January 2025 and now operate through the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Their exit followed years of disputes over military takeovers, sanctions and relations with outside powers. Yet the borders they share with ECOWAS countries have not moved.
There has been a diplomatic opening. At talks in Dakar on October 17, the two blocs agreed to establish working groups to negotiate future cooperation. The ECOWAS communiqué outlines a process, not a settlement.
Mahama offered a striking image of the relationship at the London summit. ‘Maybe we have moved into separate rooms, but we live in the same house, and we are still married,’ he said. The line does not erase the mistrust.
The border is where the cost is felt
For communities living between the Sahel and the coast, these divisions are not abstract. A farmer needs access to markets; a lorry driver needs a safe road; border officials need to know whom to call when an armed group moves into the next district. An intelligence gap can become somebody else’s emergency.
The 2026 Global Terrorism Index found that more than 76 percent of terrorist attacks in 2025 occurred within 100 kilometres of an international border. Six of the ten countries most affected by terrorism were in sub-Saharan Africa. The figures are global rather than a measure of West Africa alone, but they underline the limits of isolated national responses.
Ghana has reason to be anxious. On February 14, eight Ghanaian tomato traders were killed in an attack in Titao, northern Burkina Faso. Their deaths brought home the risks to ordinary people earning a living across the frontier. In August, Accra and Ouagadougou signed a defence agreement to protect trade corridors, providing for intelligence sharing, joint patrols and coordinated aerial surveillance.
Whether those measures have substantially reduced attacks remains to be demonstrated. But they show why securing roads may prove a more immediate basis for cooperation than grand arguments about regional institutions.
Ghana is already building bridges
Mahama’s proposal is stronger than a conference slogan because it sits alongside diplomatic work already under way.
Earlier in 2026, Ghana and Burkina Faso revived a dormant joint cooperation commission and signed seven agreements covering transport, border administration, disaster response and other practical matters. In August came the separate defence pact. Neither step repairs the ECOWAS–AES split, but both suggest cooperation can continue without settling it first.
On October 22, Ghana’s special envoy to the AES, Larry Gbevlo-Lartey, said Accra planned to host a meeting of a proposed coalition involving West and Central African countries. ‘We continue to engage and work towards cooperation with all the other countries,’ he told Ghana News Agency. He said the three Sahel governments wanted to engage ECOWAS collectively through their own alliance.
That is a revealing detail. For the AES leaders, cooperation must not look like surrendering the sovereignty they have made central to their political identity. For coastal states, collaboration cannot mean abandoning concerns about constitutional order or civilian protection.
Mahama has tried to keep both doors open. As Africa Briefing reported after his New York appearance, he argued for sustained contact with the Sahel governments rather than isolation. Ghana also raised possible support for the proposed accord during Mahama’s October 5 talks with Egypt. That shows diplomatic outreach, not a commitment by Cairo to join or fund the arrangement.
Why another security framework might fail
The obvious objection is that West Africa already has security mechanisms. The Accra Initiative was established in 2017 to improve cooperation against violent extremism and transnational crime, particularly near the common borders of Sahelian and coastal states. ECOWAS has its own security architecture and plans for a regional counterterrorism force.
Mahama says the Accra Initiative has run aground. That is his assessment; it does not, by itself, explain why the mechanism struggled or establish that a replacement will work better. The new accord would need to show what it can do differently: exchange usable intelligence quickly, sustain joint operations and resolve disputes without paralysing field commanders.
Money presents another obstacle. At an August 2025 meeting, ECOWAS financing discussions considered a 5,000-strong counterterrorism brigade estimated at $2.61bn in its first year, or a phased 1,650-person option estimated at $481.5m initially. Those are historical planning estimates for an ECOWAS force, not a budget for Mahama’s proposed accord. They nevertheless show why even an agreed security mission can struggle to take shape.
The danger is to announce a new structure while the old ones remain short of money, political backing and operational trust.
The foreign-power question cannot be avoided
Then there is geopolitics. The military governments in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have built closer security relationships with Russia after distancing themselves from traditional Western partners. Coastal governments maintain different combinations of European, American and other international assistance.
Mahama has signalled flexibility. At the London summit, he said countries genuinely willing to fight terrorism should be welcome, including Russia. As Africa Briefing examined, openness to assistance is not an endorsement of every partner’s conduct, and it leaves difficult questions about oversight and civilian safety.
A workable accord would need rules for sharing sensitive intelligence, protecting information supplied by outside partners and investigating abuses. These details determine whether governments cooperate when the next attack occurs — and whether civilians trust the forces acting in their name.
Djiby Sow of the Institute for Security Studies has argued that bilateral agreements may offer a practical route back to regional cooperation. His October 22 analysis highlights vulnerable border zones around northern Benin and the Mali–Burkina Faso–Cote d’Ivoire triangle. The lesson is that cooperation may have to begin where the risks are sharpest, rather than waiting for a perfect diplomatic blueprint.
What would count as progress?
The first meaningful signal will not be another declaration. It will be a confirmed list of participating governments, an agreed mandate and a timetable for the coalition meeting Ghana has proposed. After that should come operational protocols, sustainable financing and credible safeguards for communities living along contested borders.
The accord should also be judged on more than the number of patrols conducted. Are traders using roads that were previously dangerous? Can displaced families return safely? Do local authorities receive warnings in time? And are violations by security forces investigated rather than ignored?
At the close of the Tana Forum on October 25, Mahama put the challenge simply: ‘We need to move from dialogue to action.’ His own proposal now invites the same scrutiny.
The Sahel and the coast are already bound together by geography, commerce and family ties. Mahama does not need to make those connections real. He needs to help governments stop treating their political differences as a reason to leave shared security problems unanswered.