

ON THE QUESTION OF WHO FOUNDED GHANA



**CONSTRUCTING AND EXECUTING THE STRATEGY
FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF SOVEREIGN
NATION-STATEHOOD**



Lang T. K. A. Nubuor

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OF SOVEREIGN NATION-STATEHOOD**

A STUDY OF NATION-STATE FORMATION IN GHANA

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In the hour of triumph we should look back and give thanks to all the statesmen who down the years had worked and striven to make possible the attainment of our independence, and to all those who had more recently played their part, both great and small, in bringing our struggle to its close.

'In this solemn hour', I concluded, 'let us not merely rejoice because we have reached our goal. Let us not merely make merry because our dearest hope has been fulfilled. Let us think first and foremost of the best interests of our country. Let us put aside petty political controversy and intrigues and lay a firm and stable foundation for the political structure of Ghana. May your thoughts, your deeds and your prayers strengthen and sustain the statesmanship of the nation.'

Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana: Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, p. 290.

Author's Word

Revolution is an art. It has been stated. Revolution is a science. Others have held. These are an expression of seeing the elephant from different angles. Revolution is both an art and a science. As a science it is studied to track down its laws of motion. As an art it involves a plot in which actors play roles that come to them as a matter of course. The point therefore is to be armed with the knowledge of these laws and apply them not only in analyzing specific situations in their historical context in order to decide on what action to take but also in the selection of the actors for specific roles. Those in the vanguard and those in the mass complement and constitute a whole – the mass being the prime agency of change. The efficiency of the vanguard resides in its ability to gauge the dispositions of the mass and the enemy's strength. To act immediately in a particular direction or postpone action until future conditions permit depends on that ability. In the current situation the revolutionary creates those future conditions to later realize the immediately impossible. Revolution is the game of the one immersed in theory as well as in practice. This is the lesson of the revolutionary life of Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, part of which is reflected in the following pages.

Summary Discussion



Dr. Kwame Nkrumah

Certain considerations on whether September 21st should be legislated as “The Founder’s Day” or “The Founders’ Day” in Ghana have tended to be based on the quest for national unity and peace - disregarding respect for historical facts. The facts of history indeed suggest that national unity and peace founded on a distorted history cannot stand the test of time. Any instrumentalist conception of history in such endeavours can only be Machiavellian and cannot be worthy of a self-respecting Parliament or Legislature.

In Dr. J. B. Danquah’s very instructive paper, ‘The Historical Significance of the Bond of 1844’, published in the Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana, Vol.3 No.1 (1957), he sets forth the criterion for determining who could be credited with the accolade of being a ‘founder’ in history. He scholarly presents a powerful legal analysis of the Bond of 1844 (normally understood to have created the Gold Coast Colony) to argue

out that the founding of the Gold Coast Colony cannot be credited to Governor George Maclean, who constructed the Bond, since he was **not interested in territorial expansion although the conditions he fostered led to it.**

In the definition of a founder, our mind is essentially directed to synonyms like “creator”, “originator”, “initiator” and also “organizer”. In this respect, The Sage English Dictionary defines the verb “to found” as ‘(to) set up or lay the groundwork for’. Central to this understanding is the object or process that is founded. That object or process symbolizes the aim and intention of the creator, the originator, the initiator, the organizer. Hence, it becomes necessary for us to determine the scope of the founder’s aim and intention in their undertaking – they must show **interest** in the undertaking.

In the historical process, where that scope exhibits continual development of the aim and intention in order for the said aim and intention to assume final definition for an epoch, it behoves on us to determine their origin and evolution either in the individual founder or founding group. It is possible then that the origin and evolution of a concept find final definition in the mind and actions of an individual or group of individuals over a certain time frame.

Hence, in our appreciation of the specific phenomenon of nationalist struggle in Ghana the question arises as to whether the Fanti Confederation, as the so-called initial African response to British domination in Ghana, conceived African nationalism as **the unity and liberation of Africans** beyond the narrow premises of the “Fanti State”; as to whether the Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS) similarly had the said conception; as to whether the National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA) did likewise; as to whether the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) projected its aim and intention in that same vein; and, finally, as to whether Dr. Kwame Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party (CPP) had the concept. These are landmark organizations in the history of Ghana.

The Fanti Confederation, on its part, was initially and essentially a war machine uniting the “Fanti States” against Asante access to the sea upon the British-Dutch unilateral agreement to exchange forts – a deed that placed Fanti areas under the Dutch trading friends of the Asante and threatened to eliminate the Fanti from their middleman position in the trade with the interior. They fought both the Dutch and the Asante but not the British who they felt had betrayed them in abandoning them as a

protectorate; for which reason they set up a veritable protest tribal 'self-government' whose Constitution they submitted to the British who in turn rejected it, re-established their control while tightening their grip on them till they formalized the evolved *de facto* relationship in the 1874 Proclamation.

The ARPS, on the other hand, as a protest movement protesting British Land Bills and other laws, never lost an opportunity, however, to assure its allegiance to the British Crown. Despite this, unlike the Fanti Confederation, it resisted the British and set its horizons beyond the Fanti tribal enclave and projected a Pan-African vision; for which reason it is here credited as the first but bourgeois nationalist movement in Gold Coast history. The Pan-African orientation of the NCBWA was rather short-lived but not without its impact. Certainly, no historian of African nationalism worth their calling ever denies Dr. Kwame Nkrumah's **ultimate and holistic** conception of African Nationalism **as the pursuit of the unity and liberation of Africans across tribal, ethnic and racial entities over the entire continent (including Ghana) for the creation of a single socialist Republican State of Africa.**

It is that concept which informs his political understanding and pursuits – in theory and action. It is that concept which commits him, with a singleness of purpose, to resist and triumph over not just colonialism but also centrifugal forces that oppose his centripetal drive for a unitary state over a territory that incorporates not just the Gold Coast Colony but also the Asante Kingdom, the Northern Territories and Trans-Volta/Togoland; which latter, at least, might otherwise not have been part of the geographical space now defined as Ghana. He conceived Ghana as an independent sovereign unitary socialist Republican State and successfully pursued and realized that concept until his 1966 overthrow after which Ghana remained a unitary Republican State trimmed of its socialist aspirations but transformed into the neo-colonial state of today. The socialist struggle for reversal continues.

As a **geographical and topographical** entity in its current dimensions, Ghana is the creation of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. As a **unitary** State, Ghana is the creation of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. As a **republican** state, Ghana is the creation of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. But as a **liberated** territory in the theatre of the ongoing Pan-African national liberation and revolutionary struggle Dr. Kwame Nkrumah represents **the defining moment** of more than a half century-old resistance (since 1894) with all its contradictions some of which retarded the pace of that struggle and continue to do just that. This latter explains why he calls on us in the above citation to acknowledge the contributions of past and present statesmen to the **independence** struggle. He consummates that struggle in application of a sophisticated blend of revolutionary direction with pragmatic considerations of the moment.

We are saying that defining nationalism in terms of **unity and liberation**, Dr. Nkrumah combines in his being the single-minded **creator** of the current geographical and topographical **dimensions** of Ghana as a nation-state which he then, as the **only consistent strategizing inheritor** of a tradition of resistance, liberates from imperialism and colonialism and transforms it into a **unitary Republic**. The dialectical linkage of these two aspects of African Nationalism in his revolutionary practice remains the unique application that ultimately defines him as THE FOUNDER of the Republic of Ghana - **constructing and executing the strategy for the attainment of Ghana as a sovereign nation-state**. That accolade can never be correctly shared with **defeated inconsistent narrow-minded and consistently obstructionist** compatriots pre-occupied with parochial tribal, ethnic, feudal-cum-neo-colonial and middle-class concerns in neglect of the interests of the masses – the vast majority.

And for no reason of political urgency whatsoever, be it the quest for national unity or peace, should the truth of history be compromised in favour of such compatriots who, in the spirit of unbending consistency and fortitude characteristic of Dr. Nkrumah, must rather be made to acknowledge this truth of history and Dr. Kwame Nkrumah's own veritable and unique position in Ghana and Africa. No need

to unjustifiably (and therefore in distortion of history) appease and attract them to the unity and liberation project for a socialist united Africa since the tide of history has its own way of throwing such obstacles into political and historical oblivion. Only that spirit in stance, historically proven, ever makes them acknowledge reality which might otherwise throw them into political obscurity.

As it is, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah is the first of his kind; incomparable to his compatriots among whom he stands tall not as a first among equals but as the Giant among the dwarfs – complete poles apart. He, it is, who lays the groundwork for the unfinished task of Revolutionary Pan-Africanism with Ghana as the **starting point** on the continent in the process of creating a single African Nation-State. Indeed, the 1960 Republican Constitution of Ghana, under his initiative, **statutorily** provided in separate articles for the respective creation and subsequent dissolution of the Republic of Ghana in preparedness for the eventual creation and establishment of a single Republican State of Africa.



In all these endeavours, Dr. Nkrumah followed the agenda of The Circle – a secret vanguard Marxist socialist organization with a restricted membership created in 1945 after the 5th Pan-African Congress of that year – for the creation of a single socialist state in West Africa as a whole. Members were expected to join and operate in other organizations all over Africa to influence them along the line of the ideological programme of The Circle’s agenda against imperialism and colonialism. The Circle was to emerge later as an independent political party. The leader of The Circle was Dr. Kwame Nkrumah himself.

Thus, in the placement of the apostrophe “s” on September 21st in Ghana the apostrophe comes before the “s” but not after it: it is “THE FOUNDER’S DAY”, not “THE FOUNDERS’ DAY”. History has long recorded this fact on the pedestal of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah’s statue in front of the old Parliament House where we find the inscription ‘FOUNDER OF THE NATION’. It cannot be re-written in distortion and for whatever reason.

To this effect, we salute the memory of Prof. John Evans Atta Mills for his proclamation of “THE FOUNDER’S DAY” in Ghana on Dr. Kwame Nkrumah’s birthday – a proclamation that still awaits legislation which is irritatingly long overdue. This proclamation was made on the basis of Prof. Atta Mills’ election campaign promise in 2008. Majority of Ghanaians accepted the idea and voted for him as President.

In turn, he honoured his word and accordingly proclaimed the birthday of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah appropriately as “THE FOUNDER’S DAY”. For once, a politician honoured a promise – a people’s wish fulfilled.

Let those who have inherited him consummate the act in Parliament but not betray him as the next great betrayal after the notorious coup d’état of 1966.

September 25th 2013 – November 15th, 2013

I

Defining the Question

The question of who founded Ghana requires definition. In the current debate, a working definition appears neglected; but it is required if we are not to speak at cross-purposes particularly within the Left or progressive forces. Such absence at times leads to a trivialization of the question in terms of who first suggested the name “Ghana” as a replacement for “Gold Coast” – as Prof. Mike Ocquaye does. Ghana is an independent sovereign unitary republican nation-state. In this paper, we address the question as to *who politically conceived and pursued the concept of Ghana as such an independent sovereign unitary republican nation-state within its currently forged geographical and topographical dimensions.*

“Topography” is defined in The Sage’s English Dictionary as ‘The configuration (outline) of a surface and the relations among its man-made and natural features’. As is well known, the constitution of Ghana as a politico-geographical entity had to be decided through a plebiscite in 1956. In the same way, the determination of whether Ghana should be a unitary or federal State and a Republic was decided respectively through elections and a referendum. All these were part of the contemporary independence struggle to absolutely end British rule; and the positions as well as actions taken on these issues by the indigenous political forces help us determine who therefore founded Ghana as is.

In defining the question in this manner we consciously avoid the rally platform type of rhetoric that pays less respect to the works of authorities in terms of historiographic substance and methodology. That is to say that we avoid the style of Prof. Mike Ocquaye in his [presentation](#) ‘The Establishment and Deepening of the Democratic Culture and Practice in Ghana’ dated August 22, 2013 and published by the Danquah Institute. In this regard we find it quite disappointing that Prof. Ocquaye should carry himself the way he does in that presentation; for, as an academician, Prof. Ocquaye needs to handle the issue at stake with the scholarly decorum that persons of his standing are normally credited with.

Preliminary Definitions

In our current enterprise, brief definitions of key concepts are required for our understanding of the issues at stake. In this respect, the concept of “founder” assumes a pride of place. Relying on The Sage’s English Dictionary, the verb “to found” is defined as ‘(to) set up or lay the groundwork for’ something which could be a system of ideas or an institution or a body of institutions. From this perspective, that dictionary defines a “founder” as ‘a person who founds or establishes an institution’. It is interesting to note that while the dictionary also defines “to establish” as ‘(to) bring about’ it also repeats its definition of “to found” as indicated above for “to establish”; that is, ‘(to) set up or lay the groundwork for’. As synonyms, therefore, both “to found” and “to establish” are defined as ‘to bring about’. Suggestive in all this is the concept of “initiate”, and of “create”, and of “originate”, and of “organize”. In fact, highlighting “founder” in the text on the computer and selecting ‘synonym’, one is provided with synonyms like “creator”, “originator”, “initiator”, and “organizer”. A founder is thus seen in these terms as a creator, an originator, an initiator, an organizer. As a result, in the discussion here we intend using these synonyms interchangeably with “founder” as English language permits.

We cannot, however, end the definition of a founder without considering their aim and intention. For, different founders might exhibit different aims and intentions in their initiatives. These aims and intentions define the end product. In this respect, we are particularly in reference to limited or narrow aims and intentions as opposed to wide aims and intentions. Certainly, a founder of a tribal movement within an ethnic group who aims at the welfare of that tribe only exhibits narrow intentions as compared with the founder of a rival tribal movement within the same ethnic group who aims at the welfare of the tribe merely as a condition for the welfare of the entire ethnic group. The aim for the latter extends from the narrow confines of the one tribe within the particular ethnic group to the intention of engulfing their entire ethnic group in the said aim. Further details might also suggest that whereas the first group’s narrow aim is restricted to a few within the tribe the second group aims at the welfare of the overwhelming majority therein. Aims and intentions are, therefore, significant in defining a founder: what kind of founder are they? Are they an elitist personality concerned with elite aspirations or a grassroots personality concerned with the aspirations of the overwhelming majority?

In matters of national and international affairs, the dictionary defines “statesman”, our next concept, as ‘a man who is a respected leader in national or international affairs’. It goes on to define “statesmanship” as ‘wisdom in the management of public affairs’. In these definitions, there is no necessary suggestion that a statesman is a founder. This does not, however, preclude a founder from being a statesman since a founder is necessarily imbued with wisdom in the management of public affairs. A statesman, we are suggesting by the given definition, is not necessarily an originator or an initiator but certainly one who manages what is already initiated or established; whereas a founder does not only initiate but also manages. Hence, an acknowledgement of contributions of a statesman does not necessarily make of him a founder. In our discussion here, we are careful not to confound a founder with a statesman since the former is more inclusive and carries a heavier burden. Sitting on the sidelines offering words of wisdom as a leader in academia or political retirement to political movements of one kind or the other might well be statesmanlike but surely not qualify one as a founding member of that movement. Hence, neither Obasanjo nor Gowon is a founder of Nigeria.

The last but one concept requiring our attention in this discussion is the concept of “liberation”. The dictionary in reference defines the concept as ‘the attempt to achieve equal rights or status’. For sure, this is quite straightforward and presents no special difficulty. We, therefore, move on to the concept

of “nationalism” as a step to dealing with the last phenomenon of “national liberation”. In this respect, our dictionary defines “nationalism” as ‘love of country and willingness to sacrifice for it’ as well as ‘the aspiration for national independence felt by people under foreign domination.’ In these two definitions, we should be quick to distinguish “country” from “nation”. Whereas a country is a certain geographically defined space a nation goes beyond restrictions of space. Nationals of a particular country could therefore be found in various other countries where they could be citizens bound by laws that might be different from those of their country of origin. Nationalism, thus, connotes love and willingness to sacrifice for one’s nation for its independence from foreign domination. Hence, national liberation is understood here as the sacrificial struggle to achieve one’s nation’s equal status with others from a condition of foreign political, economic, cultural and other domination.

III

Origin of Anti-Colonial Resistance in Ghana



Dr. J. B. Danquah

The colonization of the coastal states which became the Gold Coast Colony years after the signing of the Bond of 1844 was a process that met with resistance from the indigenes late in the second half of the 19th century. In his very interesting [paper](#) 'The Historical Significance of the Bond of 1844', published in the Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana Vol. 3, No. 1(1957) before the independence celebrations on March 6th, 1957, Dr. J. B. Danquah powerfully argues out in a legal analysis that the Bond was not a **treaty** but a **declaration** by the Fanti chiefs surrendering 'certain of their rights and liberties in bondage to the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland' (page 6).

He explains that the Bond was a **voluntary** act by the Fanti chiefs to bind themselves and their people to British **judicial** authority and that the Governor in signing it as a **witness** was not bound by its terms as it would have been if it were a **treaty**. He adds that the

chiefs did not surrender their entire sovereignty as an independent people; neither did Captain George Maclean, the Governor or President of the Council of Merchants administering at the Cape Coast Castle, also construct the terms of the Bond in that light – being interested mainly in 'the introduction of British ideas of justice to the people' and 'not interested in the acquisition of political power in the Gold Coast' (page 5).

Dr. Danquah's explanation of and comment on the consequences of the Fanti chiefs' action are better quoted than paraphrased thus:

By the Bond, a free people, who were not subjects of the British sovereign, voluntarily placed themselves under a binding agreement to the British Crown. In thereby **diminishing and abrogating certain** of their ancient rights and liberties, they secured a better maintenance of their society which was growing more complex by reason of its contact with a society based on a differently organised system of values.

The first axiom or self-evident truth is therefore that the Chiefs who signed it placed the exercise of **certain** specified ancient rights and liberties, for instance the right to constitute their own courts, in bondage to the Queen of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. That two minds, unconnected by race, but chiefly by a trade separated by three thousand miles of sea, should so easily have forged such a **juridical link** between them, is a world-shaking event (page 7). *Emphases added.*

At page 10, Dr. Danquah states that 'We get at the core of the unique value of the Bond as a **constitutional document** by looking (at) its recitals, a set of admissions which showed that the Fante Chiefs have, for the purpose of a better system of society, burnt their boat of complete independence and assumed new obligations...' (emphasis added). Thus, for Dr. Danquah, the Fanti Chiefs, **seeking to build a better system of their society**, constitutionally gave up **some** of their own ancient rights and

liberties to the British in a unilateral declaration or Bond. We should be mindful that he refers to only a **juridical** relation, 'a juridical link', and nothing more.

In fact, according to Dr. Danquah at page 12, before the arrival of Captain George Maclean in 1830 the Fanti had not only made the European settlers and traders pay rent on the lands on which their forts were built but also exercised 'rights of sovereignty over the European settlers' by which they inflicted 'diverse punishments or chastisements upon them' in certain cases over the previous centuries. 'All this', he says at page 14, 'was to be changed by Maclean in a short space of 14 years...' Dr. Danquah, at page 18, then refers to him, ominously without comment, as 'the man who has been referred to recently by Professor J. D. Fage as **the founder** of the Gold Coast Colony' (emphasis added).

Indeed, Dr. Danquah initially qualifies Prof. Fage's said reference. For, under Maclean only limited sovereignty of a **juridical** nature was seceded to the British; that is to say, control over the land and people (**political power**) had not yet been attained by the British. This was to happen thirty years afterwards in 1874, he argues. In fact, prior to the signing of the Bond of 1844 the British Parliament, as quoted by Dr. Danquah, observed in 1843 how without the application of force the indigenes, including their Chiefs, outside the jurisdiction of the Governor, had voluntarily submitted to 'British Equity' owing to Maclean's and the other Magistrates' fairness in dispensing with justice. To regularize this *de facto* development, that Parliament recommended it 'desirable that this jurisdiction be better defined and understood'. There was no suggestion of a political takeover or control.

Notwithstanding that, Dr. J. B. Danquah credits Governor Maclean with creating the condition out of which the Protectorate or Colony emerged. This falls short of acknowledging Maclean as the **founder** of the said Protectorate or Colony – a political entity that he says Maclean was **not** interested in. Dr. Danquah's forthright statement is made at page 20 in the following terms:

Out of the irregular, Maclean created regularity and law; out of chaos, he created order. That a British "protectorate" or "colony" eventually arose out of Maclean's achievement may rightly be credited to the condition he fostered and prospered. But a close examination of the Bond of 1844, drafted by him, gives not the slightest indication that he was interested in territorial expansion. His main interest was in the expansion and perpetuation of justice, what we now call British justice. It did not seem to matter to Maclean who was the territorial owner of a territory so long as the light of justice shone wherever the light touch of his hand could reach. This Maclean touch is what made the Bond of 1844 possible, the Bond by which the "Fantee Chiefs" bound themselves to mould the customs of their own country "to the general principles of English law".

To the everlasting credit of the Gold Coast people and their Chiefs let this be said. Without them and their good sense, their own inestimable appreciation of values, Maclean's achievement could not have reached the height of glory it did, and the Bond of 1844 might never have been written or signed.

Thus, Dr. Danquah does not credit Governor Maclean with what he (Maclean) was **not interested in** but which nevertheless emerged out of conditions he had created. That is, he, unlike Prof. Fage, does not acknowledge Maclean as the 'founder of the Gold Coast Colony' although that Colony might have emerged from conditions that he created. In plain language at page 23, Dr. J. B. Danquah explicitly disagrees with Prof. Fage when he concludes that "The Bond, as it stands, did not create the Gold

Coast a British protectorate or colony. The circumstances that led to that were to develop later.’ Such a powerful sense of historical logic, we suggest, must be applauded, acknowledged and **consistently applied** by professional historians and politicians in their scientific apportionment of credit.

It is now only left for us to dilate but very briefly on Dr. Danquah’s narrative of the creation of the Colony or Protectorate as an **illegality** which formed the basis of his conception of liberation in the Gold Coast. For him, the whole struggle for liberation revolves around not the abrogation of the Bond of 1844 but the ‘unilateral declaration which was described ... as “a Proclamation emanating from the sole authority of the Queen”.’ For him, therefore, it was a legal issue that inspired the liberation struggle in the Gold Coast. This is how he puts it:

At the first opportunity, thirty years after the Bond, in 1874, as soon as the British felt strong enough to give full expression of their imperial power over the Gold Coast, the Secretary of State, the Earl of Carnarvon, rejected the prudential policy which had inspired his predecessor, Lord Stanley, and the House of Commons in the middle of the century, and decided to impose on the Gold Coast a unilateral declaration which was described by him as “a Proclamation emanating from the sole authority of the Queen”.

The intent of that Proclamation, and not the Bond of 1844, is the first written indication of the exercise of British imperial jurisdiction in the Gold Coast, and when Gold Coast politicians speak of liberation, it is from the restraints of this document and its successors, culminating in the Orders in Council of 1901, that they speak, not really the Bond of 1844.

Hence, the origin of the resistance to British rule, Dr. Danquah thinks, is located in the lack of caution or prudence on the part of the British of the 1870s and beyond in making a unilateral declaration to impose absolute British rule. The spirit of that view appears to suggest that if, like the Bond of 1844, the people had made such a unilateral declaration to be ruled by the British the resistance movement would not have been provoked.

This understanding certainly created the conditions for a **legalistic** tussle with the British administration and led to increasing admission of the African elite into the colonial legislature. This legalistic tussle also certainly created the conditions for the essentially non-legal struggles in the streets that eventually won self-government and independence for a redefined Gold Coast.

In Prof. Mike Ocquaye’s presentation, Dr. Danquah’s systematic analysis and exposition is essentially contradicted. For, according to Prof. Ocquaye, ‘In 1821, the British directly assumed control of the Gold Coast (i.e. the Gold Coast Colony)’. This is historically incorrect. In fact, in 1821 there was nothing like ‘the Gold Coast Colony’. As Dr. Danquah explains above, ‘the Gold Coast Colony’ was created only in 1874.

For a detailed understanding of Dr. J. B. Danquah, see his paper on the Bond of 1844, written on January 12th, 1957 and extensively quoted herein, at:

<http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/41405698?uid=3738072&uid=2474846367&uid=2134&uid=2&uid=70&uid=3&uid=60&sid=21102752050343>.

IV

Development of Anti-Colonial Resistance

1. The Fanti Confederation

Dr. J. B. Danquah's legal analysis of the Bond of 1844 and the British Proclamation of 1874 declaring the Gold Coast as a British Colony alerts us on a historical connect between the *de facto* and the *de jure*. Dr. Danquah acknowledges that the Bond was a successful attempt to legalize Captain George Maclean's exercise of unauthorized judicial functions outside areas of British jurisdiction. He explains that Maclean's act was justified on the basis of the confidence that the Chiefs and people living outside British jurisdiction had in his court and were actually submitting themselves voluntarily to its jurisdiction **before** the Bond was signed.

In dealing with the Proclamation, however, he overlooks the *de facto* emergence of a "protectorate" prior to that declaration. The British in the 1870s really spoke of the Gold Coast as living 'under the protection of Great Britain' and believed themselves to be 'the protecting Government'. (See Kimberly's letter to Kennedy, dated London, 16 January, 1872). In fact, he does not speak of a "'protectorate" **and** a "colony"' arising out of the condition that Maclean fostered but rather 'a British "protectorate" **or** "colony"' and thus does not seem to distinguish a "protectorate" from a "colony" – and so mistakenly using the two terms interchangeably.

On the part of the drafters of the [Constitution](#) of the Fanti Confederation, the relation with the British was one of submission of the Fanti to the approval of the British administration. In a covering letter attached to a copy of the Constitution submitted to the Colonial Administrator and 'for the information of the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies', the Fanti Chiefs wrote in respect of the Constitution that 'Our sole object is to improve the condition of our peoples, **not to interfere with**, but to **aid our benefactors** on the sea coast, and we count upon your Excellency giving us at times that **assistance** which may be necessary to carry out our humble efforts' (emphases added).

In more explicit terms, Article 37 of the Constitution made a decision of 'the Ministry and Executive Council' subject to appeal to the British Courts. It states 'That it be the duty of the Ministry and Executive Council ... (b) To hear, try and determine all important appeal cases brought before it by the under-secretary, option being allowed to any party or parties dissatisfied with the decision thereof to appeal to the British Courts.' Prior to this, Article 33 makes the Executive Council 'the final court of appeal of the Confederation' to hear 'important appeal cases'. Thus, the combined effect of the covering letter and these Articles was the subordination of the Confederation to British authority.

It is instructive to notice that the Constitution did not consider the British as an enemy. In fact, it rather states its object, in part, at Article 8 (i) 'To promote friendly intercourse between all the kings and chiefs of Fanti, and to unite them for offensive and defensive purposes against their common enemy', and, as already quoted from the covering letter, counts on the British 'giving us at times that assistance which may be necessary to carry out our humble efforts.' These voluntary acts of subservience to the British authority created the condition not only for Fanti collaboration with the British against the Asante during the Sagrenti War of 1874 but also the British Proclamation of the Gold Coast as a Colony – thus, transforming the *de facto* protectorate into a complete colony.

In arriving at this stage, the Colonial administration at Cape Coast used a combination of threats and wooing of the Kings and Chiefs 'in order to break up the Confederation', according to Lennart Limberg in his [article](#) 'The Economy of the Fante Confederation', published by the Historical Society of

Ghana in the Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana, Vol. 11 (1970), page 102. Limberg says at length that

On his return to the Coast in March, 1872, Ussher (the Administrator) did not hesitate to adopt a hard attitude towards the Confederation; and especially its levying of taxes was pointed to as illegal.

But the administration at Cape Coast not only threatened, but also wooed in order to break up the Confederation. In letters published in *The African Times*, Salmon (the Acting Administrator) is accused of bribing the kings and chiefs. On his return Ussher informed the Chiefs of Cape Coast, and some of the interior Kings of the intention of Her Majesty's Government to subsidize them according to their rank, and loyalty to the Crown.

These two sides of the British policy towards the Confederation, declaring the taxes illegal or impossible to levy, and bribing the kings and chiefs, obviously influenced its leaders. This is shown in a new scheme for the Fanti Confederation, drafted in April 1872, and presented to the new Governor, Pope-Hennessy during his stay on the coast. In the new scheme a budget was also included and this contained a big item for "Stipends to kings and chiefs." The most striking change in the constitution is, however, that now the Confederation was to levy no taxes whatsoever. Instead it was proposed that half of the £20,000 needed yearly should be furnished from the colonial chest at Cape Coast. The rest was to come from "court fees, fines, &c."

Limberg adds on the same page that 'In the scheme of April 1872, the leaders of the Confederation asked Her Majesty's Government for £7,200 to pay expenses for their first attempt, "since the Government was opposed to imposing any taxes or duties". At the Colonial Office this was considered "a cool request", and the money was of course never paid.' At a point, according to Limberg, 'the initiative rested with the British authorities' and it remained there 'until all hope was gone and the Fante Confederation was finally dead'. The Constitution's plan, constructed on the wake of criticism of 'the educated men in leading positions' of the Confederation for their previous handling of the finances, never materialized.

It is clear from all this that the so-called nationalism of the Fanti Confederation was a self-serving and parochial tribal machine with the object of fighting in collaboration with their self-imposed British juridical overlords-cum-allies against the aggressive Asante and their Dutch allies. It had no conception of achieving a true self-government, its projections being in anticipation of assistance from the British to whom they were steadily relinquishing 'their ancient rights and liberties', as Dr. Danquah puts it. Those self-seeking Kings and Chiefs and a corrupt class of educated men had no intention whatsoever to unite the various tribal and ethnic groups for the crystallization of the kind of state we now have in Ghana, though painfully neo-colonial.

And this is not to talk about any effort on their part to liberate themselves from their self-imposed juridical British colonial master; for, the *raison d'être* was this yet absent. Certainly, they cannot be credited with a hand in founding Ghana as is. The **intention and interest** were never there. On this score, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah's politically correct and titillating assertion in his Ghana: Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, at page 186 regarding 'the forming of the Fanti Confederation in an effort to oppose British imperialism' can only be considered not to be grounded well in the facts of history. The

Confederation did no such thing. Prof. Oquaye is similarly mistaken in stating that 'The Bond of 1844 made the nationalist struggle in Ghana a different proposition' since there was no such struggle yet.

The truth of history stands independently of and despite political correctness. A brief account of Fanti-British-Dutch-Asante relations is given at the blog [Ghana, A Living History](#). An even more critical evaluation of the Confederation and its so-called nationalism is made by [Trevor R. Getz](#).

2. The Aborigines Rights Protection Society

If the period of the *de facto* protectorate ended with the 1874 Proclamation that created the Gold Coast Colony and that that period was characterized by Fanti kings' and chiefs' collaboration with the British, the situation was seriously different from the aftermath of that Proclamation. Resistance to colonial rule finds its genesis in the latter period when imperialism became more aggressive in its acquisition drives and the mass of the people were introduced into the struggle against British rule for the first time in the Colony. The method of handling African-British relations saw its first signs of radicalization though that did not lead to the abandonment of what LaRay Denzer, in his [article](#) 'Aborigines Rights Protection Society: Building the Foundation of Modern Ghana', calls the 'conservative and constitutional approach to protest'. Radicalization introduced a dialectic with street action and table negotiation dimensions. The extent of consistent employment of these dimensions jointly and severally in the liberation struggle was to determine the fate of both British and indigenous political forces.

Before the emergence of the ARPS in 1897/8 and upon the colonial government's submission of its first Land Bills in 1894, Denzer tells us, the knowledge of the government's plans sparked off 'organized petitions, public demonstrations, mass meetings, and a powerful press campaign, masterminded by Reverend Samuel Richard Brew Attah-Ahuma (formerly Samuel Solomon) (1875-1921), who made no apology for turning his newspaper, the Gold Coast Methodist Times, from a religious organ into an engine of political protest.' Upon its emergence, the ARPS, according to LaRay Denzer, in his [article](#) 'Joseph Ephraim Casely Hayford: Architect of Inter-War West African Unity', 'organized a series of public demonstrations against (the Land Bill of 1897)' and claimed victory after its 'deputation of three wealthy merchants' succeeded in extracting from the Secretary of State for the Colonies an assurance that 'native law shall remain and prevail with regard to the devolution of land'. The dialectic was well applied at this early stage of its activities.

It is instructive to observe that the Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS) – having, in the words of LaRay Denzer, 'emerged from a protracted protest carried out by the Fante chiefs and people against a sustained attempt by the colonial government to pass legislation restricting their rights of land ownership and usage as well as assuming control of mineral and forest rights' and having applied the new dimension of struggle introduced by the chiefs and people in the streets while combining it with the other dimension of sending a delegation – succeeded in their pressure on the British. But in this final decade of the nineteenth century colonial rule was being aggressively established in West Africa. 'Mindful of the prevailing political climate of oppression and retaliation, indigenous chiefs and their educated subjects in the colonies evolved strategy and tactics that emphasized a conservative and constitutional approach to protest, always stressing their loyalty as British subjects.' The ARPS religiously stuck to this approach till it became irrelevant and passed off.

The reaction of the chiefs, the educated persons and the people against the British was **spontaneous** and it was out of this **spontaneity** that the organized force of the ARPS emerged in later years. For as long, therefore, as the ARPS connected its activities with the people's resistance it remained useful, *gbeyecious* and, therefore, relevant. Once a disconnect was occasioned by its restriction to the 'con-

servative and constitutional approach' side of the evolved method in its dialectic it was poised on a downward slide and increasingly became irrelevant as a political force even in the eyes of the British who then disregarded it. Dr. S. K. B. Asante [puts](#) it all in this way:

The elite's penetration of the mass elements of the Gold Coast was still limited at this time. The educated intellectuals such as Danquah and Sekyi showed little awareness of the problems and needs of the rural areas. A gulf therefore emerged between them and the mass elements.' (p. 42) '[T]he Aborigines were comparatively moderate in their attacks on colonial domination' [and exhibited] 'the slow and compromising tactics of the middle-class nationalist intellectuals of the old school' (p. 45). [When they appeared at the 5th Pan-African Congress in the person of G. Ashie-Nikoi as their representative, their instructions to him] 'did not anywhere mention the interests of the masses. They were an interesting reflection of the wishes of the Gold Coast middle-class nationalists (p.42).

This ideological gulf reflected in the emphasis placed on the 'conservative and constitutional approach' dimension of the new dialectic, we reiterate.

As it turned out, in the [words](#) of LaRay Denzer, its early success 'proved to be the high water mark in its activities as a political interest group' since it thereafter concentrated on masses-free approaches. That explains why the land issue eclipses other dimensions of its activities; and, in its final years, not surprisingly, it was principally concerned with its growing irrelevance – for which reason it sought the ears of the British to be recognized, in Dr. Asante's phraseology, as the 'medium between government and people' through other platforms like the 5th Pan-African Congress.

Unlike the Fanti Confederation (and although ARPS emerged from the protest of Fanti chiefs and people), the ARPS had a broad horizon spanning across the African continent and beyond. It went beyond tribal concerns. Dr. S. K. B. Asante, in his article 'The Neglected Aspects of the Activities of the Gold Coast Aborigines Rights Protection Society', published in the [Phylon](#) (1960-), Vol. 36, No. 1 (1st Qtr. 1975), p. 32, is particularly anxious to call our attention to the fact that 'Almost throughout the period of its existence, pan-African consciousness was very much evident in the thought and activities of the Aborigines Society.' For the benefit of those who connect the ARPS with land issues only, he explains that 'The leaders of the Society were keenly aware of their membership in the Negro race and were desirous to maintain the integrity and to assert the equality of that race. They identified themselves with the problems affecting the African continent as a whole and developed a sense of affinity with national movements of other parts of the world.'

It is of grave importance that as early as July 1900, just three or two years after the formation of the ARPS, its organ *The Gold Coast Aborigines* took interest in the first Pan-African Conference of that date organized on the initiative of Henry Sylvester Williams. Quoting from its August 31 1900 issue, Dr. Asante has that organ predicting thus:

We predict that Africa will always remain what it has always been – the black man's continent. There may be fringes of population of whites here and there, but the main bulk of the people will be black. We talk of Boer and Briton in South Africa, as if that were a statement of the whole matter. What if, at some distant date in the future, South Africa should belong to neither Boer nor Briton, but to the Negro – his by right, by su-

perior numbers, and superior power? We may smile at the idea, but it may easily become a tremendous reality.

He notes, however, that it was in the 1930s that the ARPS devoted more attention to and became involved in the 'anti-imperialist and pan-African associations abroad' (p.34). It 'had then been discredited by the local colonial government as a force in Gold Coast politics', he adds therein. Its contacts with personalities of Pan-Africanism were stimulated by its agitations against certain laws.

On the platform of the 5th Pan-African Congress in 1945, at a time when the Aborigines 'were very much on the decline, and were gradually passing out of the political arena in the Gold Coast' (p. 44), they stated that they 'had come to "ask this Congress to see that West Africa gets its political emancipation. It is our right and we must have it ... We do not want freedom that is partially controlled – we want nothing but freedom.'" (p. 43). They had their lights on West Africa, not a tribal enclave. No wonder then that 'Most of the constitutional and economic points listed in the Aborigines' instructions to Ashie-Nikoi were included in the Congress' resolutions on West Africa.' (p. 43).

Our anxiety here has been to briefly call attention to the broad political horizon and methods of struggle that the ARPS adopted in contrast with the collaborationist stance of the Fanti Confederation. The Aborigines Rights Protection Society, unlike the Confederation, had the British but not other Africans as its target of combat. Against the British it initially applied the historically evolved dialectic in the method of struggle although to its own chagrin it de-emphasized and jettisoned an aspect of that dialectic. It can certainly and should certainly be credited with the accolade of a 'nationalist movement' that created conditions for the development of anti-colonial resistance. We are left in no doubt that it was truly the **first** but bourgeois-oriented nationalist movement in the then Gold Coast.

However, as Dr. Danquah has explained, creating conditions is not enough; interest, and therefore intention, with a precise content is decisive. ARPS's rejection of radical opposition to British domination did not only render it irrelevant. The organization died a natural death.

3. National Congress of British West Africa



J. E. Casely Hayford

Dr. S. K. B. Asante, at page 42 of his article referred to, does not only say that Aborigines' interests reflected the wishes of Gold Coast middle-class nationalists. He indeed adds that the instructions sent to Ashie-Nikoi 'were almost identical to the legal, political and economic demands of the National Congress of British West Africa of the 1920s.' Fact is that in his [article](#) 'The National Congress of British West Africa: Regional Mobilization and an Emergent Pan-African Consciousness', Michael G. Hanchard corroborates this outlook of the Congress as an elitist organization of the middle-class nationalists. He states that 'the purpose of the congress was ultimately conservative, in the sense that it was elite-driven and concerned with maintaining good relations with Britain'.

The livewire of the Congress was J. E. Casely Hayford about whose 'heroic qualities' LaRay Denzer says that 'biographical writing has continued to emphasize' and credited him 'as one of the founding fathers of the Ghanaian nation.' Certainly, Denzer does not himself so credit him; neither does he contest it. He does not commit himself either here or there. He surely appears to be in a dilemma. For, Casely Hayford was for between fourteen and fifteen years (1916-1930), that is, until his death, a member of the Legislative Council as leading unoffi-

cial member serving the British while contesting them 'for structural reforms and greater autonomy'. Certainly, the 'British authorities sought to frustrate the congress at every turn' since the Congress' 'existence also threatened British rule'.

Since, according to Hanchard, the death of Casely Hayford in 1930 'effectively brought an end to the congress, even though its political effectiveness had long been undermined by its ideology and internal dissension', he was not only the Congress' livewire but also its history personified. The references to the ideological orientation of the Congress were all references to its founder's orientation. Within the context of Gold Coast politics, Casely Hayford's Congress was opposed not only by the British but also the traditional rulers among whom Nana Ofori Atta of Akim Abuakwa has been cited for special mention. His reconciliation with the latter rulers was only on the eve of his death in 1929. The 'traditional chiefs ... saw the prospects of their own future power and influence diminished by a Congress led by a Western educated but nonetheless Ghanaian elite', Hanchard adds.

The significance of the chiefs' resistance to the Congress is not to be seen just in the fact that 'the Ashanti chieftaincy, most notably Ofori Atta, and the British officials often collaborated' but seriously in the fact that these latter 'collaborated to undermine the effectiveness of the Congress' attempts at broadening its **popular and organizational base** by arguing that the organization's efforts were attempting to erode traditional values and institutions of indigenous life' (emphasis added). Thus, at play in domestic politics was the feudal factor as a destabilizer in its incorrect handling by the Congress. In fact, the account suggests that the Congress in the person of Casely Hayford gave in to the feudal forces and they 'cooperated in the pursuit of political reform and social justice.' Hence, if the ARPS neglected the other aspect of the organizational dialectic the NCBWA on its part made but unsuccessful attempts at it. It remained in part, organizationally and essentially, like the Aborigines.

But, as stated, in part, only in part. Whereas the ARPS hopped from one Pan-African platform to the other internationally contributing to speeches without organically constituting itself as part of an ongoing organization that embraces and goes beyond the boundaries of the then Gold Coast, the Congress incorporated the four British colonies of Nigeria, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and The Gambia in its organizational structure and operations. According to Denzer, Casely Hayford, and therefore the Congress, 'was an even more forceful proponent of the idea of West African unity. Whereas Edward Blyden's ideas remained ethereal and undefined, Casely Hayford articulated a clear-cut program of regional unification.' Not just that: Casely Hayford and some of his colleagues did not only initiate discussion to form a united British West African front but also fabricated their organizational ideology and tactics from various sources like the National Congress of India.

Denzer tells us that Casely Hayford was familiar with the organizational ideas of Marcus Garvey and W. E. B. DuBois. But what was of organizational value and strategic concern for him was that – and he 'made it clear that he differed from African American thinking on this issue' – West Africans familiar with local politics and the environment but not African Americans must have the initiative for African development and change. In this respect, according to Denzer, 'He was more African-oriented culturally, more universal in his treatment of race questions ... (and) (d)iving home this point, he argued that African Americans, as a result of their wholesale assimilation into American culture, were disqualified from assuming the role of political mentors to Africans'. Denzer adds, however, that he later became 'more tolerant of outside agency' although he insisted that 'potential immigrants, if allowed to settle in Africa, must accept local jurisdiction'.

From these positions it is clear that although the National Congress of British West Africa could not survive for more than a decade and in spite of its middle-class orientation, it consciously sought to go

beyond its elitist confines to broaden its organizational base. Its frustrations, due to the malignant collaboration of local chiefs with British officials, notwithstanding, it was able to constitute a **non-racist** threat to imperialism and influence the subsequent adoption of some of its positions on issues. Again, LaRay Denzer tells us that 'Although the colonial government tried to downplay the influence of the new organization, there is no doubt that subsequent political and educational reforms took the shape originally promulgated by the NCBWA.' In addition to these organizational and policy initiatives, the NCBWA's brand of practical Pan-African organizational drive, in spite of its limitation of concentrating on British West African territories, established what was to become an inspiration for total liberation of the African wherever they might be.

Dr. Kwame Nkrumah is to acknowledge later in his *Autobiography* (p. 21) that it was the NCBWA secretary, Mr. S.R. Wood, who 'introduced me to politics' although it was through Dr. Kwegyir Aggrey 'that my nationalism was first aroused' (p. 14). The effect of this introduction was soon to prove telling on the Gold Coast and Africa as a whole in terms of not just broadening the organizational base of the anti-colonial resistance in practice but also its radicalization to effect – way beyond what the NCBWA leadership could ever imagine or even be interested in and intend. Surely then, the NCBWA created further conditions for the anti-colonial resistance but failed Dr. J. B. Danquah's test and therefore cannot be credited with founding Ghana as is: an independent sovereign unitary republican state without the British Queen as Head of State.

4. United Gold Coast Convention

This far, we have observed a process of the development of the method of anti-colonial resistance and its application which has its antecedents in the pre-colonial period – that method being characterized by elements of **spontaneity** and **conscious organization** in their co-ordinated expression.

Spontaneous resistance involves reaction from the grassroots of society and is characterized by general lack of co-ordination in action execution. It stems from the perception of a common threat. The element of conscious organization emerges out of that "chaotic" situation to address it in a focused manner for maximum effect. The history of African societies exhibits this dialectic of resistance. It was applied prior to the colonial period as a tradition in war strategy. Once ignored, defeat was certain.

The common threat from a neighbour aroused the indignation of society as a whole and the need for action was impressed on the existing leadership which then mobilized the society to confront the perceived threat. Only then would that leadership determine the trend that the struggle assumed. This tradition in resistance and war strategy developed in content over the course of historical time. Its essence lay in **mass participation** the absence of which occasioned certain defeat.

We have indicated above how, by a process of alienation of the chiefs and educated class from each other and the elite classes from the mass of the people, the British broke the front of the chiefs and their subjects as a prelude to the unilateral 1874 Proclamation which inaugurated the Gold Coast Colony. We have also outlined how the observance of the organizational dialectic chalked victory for the Aborigines in their struggle against the Land Bills on their assumption as the spearhead of mass action. In this latter respect, we took note of their defeat once the mass element was jettisoned.

It is clear that the rise of the educated class in its progressive march to assume the leadership of society in replacement of the chiefs was accompanied by a general change in the method of resistance. Rather than perfect the traditional or evolved method of struggle that combined mass spontaneity with conscious organization the educated class generally zeroed in on a truncated version of it. Domi-

nated by lawyers, it stressed on legal approaches to the virtual neglect of the mass line. If the ARPS abandoned the mass line after its initial success, the NCBWA was frustrated in its application. The UGCC came in not only to inherit the ARPS's ineffectual method – line, hook and sinker. It died out.

Dr. Kwame Okoampa-Ahoofe, Jr., in [Part 5](#) of his article series 'The Enduring Legacy of Dr. J. B. Danquah' (April 7, 2005), is anxious to erase the perception of the UGCC as an elitist outfit. Connecting the activities of the Gold Coast Youth Conference founded by Dr. Danquah with those of the UGCC, he nevertheless observes that 'indeed, as available documents regarding the seminal activities of the Gold Coast Youth Conference attest, the latter appears to have squarely aimed at the salutary expansion and development of the Gold Coast community of **African intelligentsia**, in anticipation of the inevitable re-assertion of the country's sovereignty in the offing' (emphasis added).

The rest of the article then illustrates how policies outlined by the Conference showed 'the imperative need to creating an economic milieu and climate conducive to individual wealth accumulation, in order to facilitate the auspicious development of a capitalist economy' and that such policies 'were well in advance of Nkrumah's arrival and involvement in Gold Coast politics in mid-1947'. In spite of this imperative need to create conditions for capitalist development, Dr. Okoampa-Ahoofe quotes Dr. Danquah from the latter's Review of the Conference's activities up to 1943 as stating that an abolition of the country's colonial status at that time would leave it unprepared due to lack of personnel.

It was not as if Dr. Danquah was 'less eager in his struggle for Ghana's sovereignty', according to Dr. Okoampa-Ahoofe, for, the former states in the Review that 'Whatever we do in an expansionist world, we must accept the principle that no control by another is ever as good as self-control'. He explains that 'Dr. Danquah's concern in reality was the fact that up to 1943, when he published his review of the activities of the Gold Coast Youth Conference, the British colonial administration **had not initiated any serious measures aimed at transforming the multinational Ghanaian polity into an organic or unified modern state** capable of effectively undertaking diplomatic activities with the larger international community' (emphasis added). He quotes Dr. Danquah in these terms:

Actually what I imagine would happen if Colonial status were abolished is something like this: Each ex-colony would feel **constrained** to choose its representative-country in world affairs, the new autonomous ex-colonial countries would be singularly **unprepared** to meet any of the great nations on anything like equal terms – (To start with, they would have no diplomatic corps, and that sort of thing!). What more natural than that we in the Gold Coast should choose Britain, many of whose traditions and institutions have long influenced our own ideals and development...

'But the important fact is that we shall be choosing England as "free agents" and shall be in a position to discuss or dictate the terms of indenture or Treaty between the two countries in a way that a Gold Coast man can walk the Gold Coast soil and earth and feel that he is walking on air. What I am not prepared to accept is any suggestion that we are congenitally or otherwise incapable of bearing independence if thrust upon us. I am unable to admit that either the Liberians or Egyptians in Africa, or the Australians or New Zealanders in the Pacific have some qualities which we in the Gold Coast haven't got' (emphases added).

Dr. Okoampa-Ahoofe finds this observation to be 'admittedly quite curious and unpalatable'. All the same he explains that 'while Danquah fundamentally believed in the equally inalienable humanity of the Ghanaian and African as a citizen, the reality of many an African colony not having been adequately prepared for the highly sophisticated culture of modern politics, presented a formidable challenge that could not be seriously ignored by the astute and clairvoyant statesman'. Specifically in respect of Ghana he states that 'Indeed, anybody who studiously followed the painful manner in which President Nkrumah pathetically bungled the administrative apparatus which he inherited from the British colonial administration, cannot but unreservedly admire Danquah's courage and honesty in acknowledging the embarrassing fact that even on the eve of Ghana's independence, 14 years after his momentous review of the activities of the Gold Coast Youth Conference, **Ghana had still not been adequately prepared for the complex culture of a modern nation-state** (emphasis added).'

Despite this he is critical of Dr. Danquah's position thus: 'It was, however, rather unfortunate for the Doyen to have anticipated that British imperialism would take upon itself the noble and altruistic mission of elevating Ghana to the enviable status of a diplomatic coequal. Consequently, Danquah was understandably caught off-guard when he was confronted with the practical realities of independence'. In fact, it was not just that Dr. Danquah had such an anticipation of British imperialism in 1943. He carried it through the formation of the UGCC in 1947 and its demise in 1951 to the eve of Independence Day in 1957. Dr. Okoampa-Ahoofe's critique resonates, quite obliquely, with Dr. Nkrumah's position in his 1945 book Towards Colonial Freedom to the effect that

The idea that Britain, France or any other colonial power is holding colonies under "trusteeship" until in their opinion, the colonies become "capable" of self-government is erroneous and misconceived. Colonial powers cannot afford to expropriate themselves. And then to imagine that these colonial powers will hand freedom and independence to their colonies on a silver platter **without compulsion** is the height of folly (emphasis added).

But Dr. Danquah's stated position was shared by other leaders of the UGCC. For, when all that was required for the achievement of independence was a formal motion in Parliament calling for independence after the 1956 elections in accordance with the British plan, Dr. K.A. Busia, the Leader of the United Party (UP) (the metamorphosed UGCC), bugged down by *gbeshie*, led a delegation to Britain appealing to the British Government not to grant independence because the country was not ready for Parliamentary democracy and pleaded with the British in these words: 'We still need you in the Gold Coast. Your experiment there is not yet complete. Sometimes I wonder why you seem in such a hurry to wash your hands off us'. (Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, p. 279.)

Dennis Austin, in his article 'The Working Committee of the United Gold Coast Convention', Journal of African History, II, 2 (1961), p. 273, characterizes the period 1947 – 1951, that is the period when the UGCC emerged and died, as 'these interesting years when the colonial administration was beginning to retreat and the nationalists to advance'. He adds that "This was the period when few of the leaders knew precisely what they wanted, but the mass of the people were becoming clear about what they disliked.' In that article, he examines the Minute Book of the Working Committee of the United Gold Coast Convention about which he says 'Dr. Danquah very kindly allowed me to read and make notes on' in 1960.

He describes the UGCC of August 1947 as the first of post-war political organizations and a confluence of earlier associations which represented 'tributaries of discontent which fed the torrent of nationalist agitation after 1945'. From other accounts it is clear that the Gold Coast Youth Conference, like the Gold Coast Youth League and Gold Coast Youth Association among others, had to become part if not the core of the UGCC. Dr. Danquah, who was its General Secretary, also became a Vice-President of the UGCC. But, according to Dr. Okoampa-Ahoofe's article though 'Dr. Danquah was indubitably ... more perspicuous', he was 'rather too staid for the highly charged political pulse of the times'. In other words, by the definition of the word "staid" by the Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners, International Student Edition, Dr. Danquah was 'serious and rather boring'.

Under such an uninspiring leadership the UGCC was not only ineffectual but also had that leadership divorced from the masses of the people. It was in this state when Dr. Ako Adjei, one of its leaders, suggested to the others to invite Dr. Kwame Nkrumah whose organizational activities in the US and Britain he was aware of as they had worked together in the US. Consequently, Dr. Danquah had to write in invitation to him to assume the position of General Secretary. Before this latter invitation, that is after Ako Adjei's letter, Dr. Nkrumah had been briefed by one Tony Maclean who had been to the Gold Coast and personally knew the 'promoters of the U.G.C.C.' On the basis of that briefing Dr. Nkrumah says that

I concluded that the sponsors of the movement were men whose political philosophy was contrary to the political aspirations of the people of the Gold Coast ... This assessment of the situation forced me to the conclusion that it was useless to associate myself with a movement backed almost entirely by reactionaries, middle-class lawyers and merchants, for my revolutionary background and ideas would make it impossible for me to work with them. (Autobiography, p.62)

In passing, it is worthy of note that in the immediate quotation Dr. Nkrumah refers to the UGCC as 'a movement' but not as 'a party'. These are not the same thing. Whereas 'a party' denotes the organization of a people **as a class** 'a movement' denotes the organization of a people **as a group of various classes**. The distinction is vital to our understanding of the dynamics of nationalist struggle in the late 1940s. For, whereas there is a general consistency in Dr. Nkrumah's references to the UGCC as 'a movement' and the Convention People's Party (CPP) as 'a party' there are moments in his Autobiography when he also loosely refers to the UGCC as 'party' and the CPP as 'the new party'. At page 69 of that book, however, he strikes the historic difference in the following terms:

The intelligentsia, having been successful in creating opposition to the Burns Constitution, now began to plan the launching of **a political movement** which could upset it. The idea of **a political party** as such never occurred to them and the party system was alien to them. In fact one of my numerous so-called crimes, according to my political opponents, is that I have introduced the party system into the country ... Because the UGCC at the beginning lacked the support of the masses and some chiefs, it is not difficult to see why it failed to make an impression. It was in an effort to make it appear **a popular movement** that I was invited to become its general secretary (emphases added).

When, therefore, Dr. Nkrumah, after 'much serious discussion' at a meeting of the West African National Secretariat to deliberate on Dr. Danquah's subsequent invitation, decided to accept the invitation, according to him, 'I was very sure of the policy that I would pursue and fully prepared to come to loggerheads with the Executive of the U.G.C.C. if I found they were following a reactionary course.'

In his consideration, arising out of his study of the Minute Book of the Working Committee of the UGCC, David Austin concludes that 'in its beginning lay its end: the two chief protagonists in 1947 were Dr. J. B. Danquah and Dr. Kwame Nkrumah'.

The former was focused on a policy of individual wealth accumulation in anticipation of the development of a capitalist economy and sought to create a movement led by the capitalist-oriented intelligentsia. The latter came with a ready policy of Marxist socialism as pronounced at the 5th Pan-African Congress and sought to create a working people's party. The UGCC 'would never be the same'. For, the ideological and organizational differences, which should never be toyed with in political struggles, were so much at cross purposes that the contradiction was bound to explode within the UGCC not only to lead to its implosion but more significantly to the emergence of a CPP antithesis.

Just after the 1945 Congress Dr. Nkrumah had formed a secret vanguard organization, The Circle, which was at the centre of the West African National Secretariat's acts. The duties of The Circle were:

Each circle member should join an organization and should adopt two methods of approach:

- (a) Advocate and work for the demands of that Organization.
- (b) Infuse that Organization with the spirit of national unity and the national independence of West Africa, and the creation of the Union of African Socialist Republics.

The Circle further set out its goal in the following terms:

At such a time as may be deemed advisable THE CIRCLE will come out openly as a political party embracing the whole of West Africa, whose policy then shall be to maintain the Union of African Socialist Republics. (See Appendix B of Autobiography)

For Dr. Nkrumah and the members of the West African National Secretariat the Danquah invitation 'was rather like the dawn of action at the end of a long and intensive training.' (p. 70) Without funds to help initiate the formation of a party the tactic of operating in an existing organization to influence it in a particular direction and emerge as an independent political party was The Circle's essential stance. The UGCC provided such an opportunity. Hence, Dr. Nkrumah's very first organizational proposal to the UGCC's Working Committee was the inclusion of the Trade Unions, Co-operative Societies and others as 'affiliates' to the UGCC. That was a critical move to transform the membership content. And even more critical was the identification of this mass content with The Circle in his person.

It is extremely important to notice that just a month after Dr. Nkrumah had received the go-ahead with his organizational proposals and during the search for him and the other leaders of the UGCC after the 1948 riots he spent the time of hiding in a house where he says that with his small typewriter 'the plans were laid that were later embodied in the programme of the Convention People's Party.' See page 78 of his book. Whatever interpretation is placed on this revelation it is clear that Dr. Nkrumah was religiously following the programme of The Circle for the ultimate emergence of an independent mass political party. He had been smart to read the draft constitution and the Minute Book of the UGCC.

What he saw was an organization with 'a couple of' inactive branches '**intended**' to be concerned 'with the Colony proper and, to a less degree, with Ashanti' while 'The Northern Territories and Trans-Volta/Togoland did not feature in their programme at all.' See pages 72 and 73. In this regard,

he did not only strongly feel the need for a united movement embracing the whole country but actually 'saw at once the urgent need for a country-wide tour with the object of setting up branches of the U.G.C.C. in every part of the country (p. 73).' He continues to say that 'The results of this were most successful, for within six months I had established 500 branches in the Colony alone.'

In these **initiatives**, which come so naturally with a committed Marxist socialist thinker and activist, Dr. Nkrumah defined the terrain and method of struggle – the whole country as the terrain and working people's participation as the essential organizational strategy. Although the organizational proposals that he presented to the Working Committee were accepted without comment Dr. Nkrumah writes that 'They probably felt that although I could not hope to succeed, there was no harm in trying.' In fact, they later, in front of the Watson Commission, dissociated themselves from those proposals. But the report of the Watson Commission that investigated the 1948 riots tells the story in part thus:

From the internal evidence of the Minute Book of the Working Committee, the Convention did not really get down to business until the arrival of Mr. Kwame Nkrumah on 16th December, 1947, and his assumption of the post as Secretary.

Mr. Nkrumah has had a varied career. He had a very diversified education in the United States and Great Britain and in both countries appears to have taken a prominent part in all political institutions designed to promote a forward African policy. Although somewhat modest in his admissions, he appears while in Britain to have had Communist affiliations and to have become imbued with a Communist ideology which only political expedience has blurred. In London he was identified particularly with the West African National Secretariat, a body which had for its objects the union of all West African Colonies and which still exists. It appears to be the precursor of a Union of West African Soviet Socialist Republics...

In a working programme circulated just before the disturbances we have been inquiring into, Mr Nkrumah boldly proposes a programme which is all too familiar to those who have studied the technique of countries which have fallen the victims of Communist enslavement. We cannot accept the naive statement of the members of the Working Committee, that although this had been circulated, they did not read it. We are willing to believe that they did. On the other hand we feel that the Working Committee, fired by Mr Nkrumah's enthusiasm and drive, were eager to seize political power and for the time being were indifferent to the means adopted to attain it. (See pp. 85-86 of the Autobiography)

The Circle Document of 1945, in terms of its Marxist orientation, had been preceded by Dr. Nkrumah's own doctoral dissertation of 1944 that applied Marxist dialectics in its analysis of society. Dr. Nkrumah and other members of The Circle [which was restricted 'to persons who are trained and engaged in political revolution as a profession', according to the Document] had set as their aim to '(1) maintain ourselves and the Circle as the Revolutionary Vanguard of the struggle for West African Unity and National Independence and (2) support the idea and claims of the All West African National Congress in its struggle to create and maintain a Union of African Socialist Republics.' There was no mention of 'Soviet' there. Dr. Danquah and the other middle-class lawyers and merchants had set out, in the words of Dr. Okoampa-Ahoofe, a relative of Dr. Danquah, to pursue 'the imperative need to creating an economic milieu and climate conducive to individual wealth accumulation, in order to facilitate the auspicious development of a capitalist economy'. The one represented Marxist socialism while the other represented capitalism – a situation of kerosene and water in the same container.

In the light of The Circle's projections for itself it would be absurd to conjecture that Dr. Kwame Nkrumah would lend himself to be used as an instrument by persons he regarded as 'reactionary'. He seized the opportunity to operate in an organization in accordance with the directions of The Circle Document to pursue specific agenda. In this respect, when the UGCC leadership reneged on paying him the promised £100 as his salary and tried to negotiate with him to rather accept £25 he 'proposed that (he) would work for nothing so long as they would take care of (his) board and lodging expenses'. In his own words, 'The whole roomful of them turned to look at me in astonishment. As each one was making an income of around two to three thousand a year, they must have thought I was either a pretty queer character or that in a shrewd way I was trying on something too clever for them to see.' See Autobiography, p. 70. They were yet to learn that making money was not his concern. His concern lay with organization of the working people to construct an independent political party.

The UGCC had no intention of mobilizing all the then four regions of the country until after Dr. Nkrumah's arrival, proposals and activities. The UGCC concentrated on the Colony proper. Its claims to having established some thirteen branches were not substantiated as in reality only a couple of inactive branches were found. Rather than use Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, a professional revolutionary, for its purposes, the latter used it to achieve the immediate objective of The Circle – formation of a political party out of the UGCC movement. That was a mass political party, a requisite for the independence struggle. The 1894-initiated new method of struggle against foreign rule received in the hands of Dr. Nkrumah the highest form of its definition at the end of the first half of the 20th century. Certainly, then, no other member in the UGCC could be credited with what they did not initiate or intended. All other evidence, apart from those cited here, attest to this in no uncertain terms.

Into mass spontaneity Dr. Nkrumah breathed the spirit of conscious mass organization to transform the UGCC into a mass movement in pursuit of the creation of an independent sovereign republican state as a first step towards a West African State; but he did this in such a way that the mass of the people who were attracted to the movement rallied around his person and therefore The Circle, a secret vanguard revolutionary organization operating similarly within the West African National Secretariat. Once he left the UGCC the latter lost its newly founded mass base and returned to its elitist status of old, leading to its demise in 1951 when Dr. J.B. Danquah was its only candidate to win the general elections of that year. Dr. Danquah never won any subsequent elections thereafter.

5. Convention People's Party

In the hands of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah the dialectic method of struggle in resistance against the colonial administration had been perfected for the period. That method, bifurcated as legal and mass street action, was first seen applied in 1894 in the spontaneous rise of the people, the chiefs and educated elite against the Land Bills that threatened to take the land from the people of the Colony. This perfecting in the application of the method of struggle did not abandon either aspect of the dialectic but rather utilized both with mass action as the dominant aspect. It did not also emerge from an empty mind resting on a pot-belly. It was located in a conscious study. In his dissertation Kwame Nkrumah: A Study in Intercultural Leadership, Dr. Samuel E. Taylor quotes Dr. Nkrumah from pages 38-39 of John Considine's 1954 book Africa: World of New Men in this respect thus:

I studied your Philadelphia politics and your labor unions; the way they are organized and the way they operate. I went to Communist meetings and Socialist meetings and Republican meetings and Labor meetings. I studied them all - the campaign methods, the way they get out the vote, the way they work with other groups, the way they bring pressure to bear...It was all most useful.

Dr. Kwame Nkrumah in his studies also understood that no colonial power ever relinquished power on a silver platter but only when forced to do so. Hence, on the platform, while preparing the mind of the crowd at the Accra Arena before announcing the transformation of the Committee on Youth Organization into a political party, he, for the first time, openly outlined the resistance method, stressing its mass-line aspect. He reports this at page 103 of the Autobiography thus:

I explained to them [the crowd of 'about sixty thousand people'] the necessity for backing our demand for self-government with a programme of positive action employing legitimate agitation, newspaper and political educational campaigns and the application of strikes, boycotts and non-cooperation based on the principle of non-violence. I advised against diplomacy and deception as I pointed out to them that the British, as past masters themselves of diplomatic tactics, would far prefer to have from us frankness and firmness. A policy of collaboration and appeasement would get us nowhere in our struggle for immediate self-government. "The time has arrived", I declared, "when a definite line of action must be taken if we are going to save our country from continued imperialist exploitation and oppression..."

A line was thus drawn between a policy of mass pressure and a policy of collaboration. Unlike the period 1898 – 1947 when the intelligentsia conducted itself on a policy of collaboration *via* constitutional approaches, the new era saw a leadership focused mainly on radical mass actions to force the pace of achieving self-government and independence. To all intents and purposes the intelligentsia was sidelined as reflected in all elections leading to the achievement of independent and republican status in 1957 and 1960 respectively.

The strategic division on policy is celebrated in Dr. Danquah's statement before Dr. Nkrumah was arrested for the CPP's declaration of Positive Action. Dr. Danquah had stated that 'It is obvious that the law, as far as Kwame Nkrumah is concerned, must go according to him. It is my opinion that those who go against constitutional authority must expect to pay for it with their neck.' Of course, Dr. Nkrumah was aware of that risk and was prepared for it. The Circle's motto of 1945 was: 'Service, Sacrifice, Suffering'. He had known of the dangers involved in taking that policy option. He had also learned of that from Mahatma Gandhi's experience. And at the appointed time, when he was to be arrested, like Gandhi, he kept calm walking steadily towards the policeman effecting the arrest.

There is no doubting that in the formulation of that policy of resistance Dr. Nkrumah was the brain and author. As the leader of The Circle he was responsible for its fabrication. No one else had, at the time, appeared qualified to do so. This is reflected in the fact that all others within The Circle were supposed to accept his leadership. Certainly, it would have been of great benefit to us if our research on The Circle had revealed the names of the other members of it. Nonetheless, it is common knowledge among historians that his type was rare. Such historians attest to the fact that he had only a few cadres to assist him in this respect. D. N. Pritt, editor of the Labour Monthly in Britain in the period after the 1966 coup d'état and who had worked at the University of Ghana, did write in a letter to Reba Lewis:

I found Nkrumah personally charming (not that that is very important to an assessment of him). I thought and think of him as a great man and a real Socialist, who tackled the appalling problems of capitalist hostility **with inadequate cadres...** (emphasis added). See Reba Lewis' letter, dated 26 July 1970 and addressed to Dr. Nkrumah, in June Milne's Kwame Nkrumah: The Conakry Years – Letters and Documents, p. 379.

If even **after** independence Dr. Nkrumah had a problem with 'inadequate cadres' we can imagine what the situation was **before** that. This confirms his own statement that he 'fought single-handed'. See his letter, dated 27 May 1967, to June Milne (*op. cit.* p. 155). The point here is that he never complained about this personnel inadequacy nor made it a reason to delay the attainment of independence. He rather declared that 'We prefer self-government with danger to servitude in tranquillity' and that 'We have the right to govern ourselves'; not to talk about his assertion that 'We have the right to live as men.' The enthusiasm generated by this singleness of purpose among the masses of the people can only be contrasted with the lethargic approach of the UGCC in its procrastinating collaborationism underscored with dogged enthusiasm to observe colonial repressive legal processes.

Dr. Kwame Okoampa-Ahoofe cites the 'bungling' of 'the administrative apparatus inherited from the British' on the part of Dr. Nkrumah as the reason why we should rather 'admire Danquah's courage and honesty in acknowledging the embarrassing fact' of personnel inadequacy. Perhaps if he re-reads Chapter 13 of the *Autobiography*, captioned 'Tactical Action', he would rather observe not just Dr. Nkrumah's insight into the problem of that inadequacy and how, from 1951, that is still under colonial rule, Dr. Nkrumah pragmatically addressed it without showing signs to the colonial authorities that as part of socialist reconstruction that administrative apparatus was to be replaced. He would indeed see and understand Dr. Nkrumah's dexterity and courage in handling his Africanization policy as compared with Dr. Danquah's fright in the face of the enormity of the problem. Hear Dr. Nkrumah:

In 1951 the twenty per cent of African government employees were mainly in the junior service. As things were going and unless Africanisation was speeded up it looked to me as if it would be many years before our people would be sufficiently qualified and experienced enough to take over responsible posts in the civil service. On the other hand, I was faced with a far more serious problem if the overseas officers, realising that Africans were being trained to take over from them and that their days were therefore numbered, resigned *en bloc* from their posts. Some of the Europeans at that time were very much of the old colonial type. The sight of an African in any job above messenger or clerk would have been more than they could stand and they might well have insisted on his removal or tendered their own resignation on the spot. Unfortunately we could not afford to wave them goodbye and I realised that the problem was going to call for much thought and tact.

From the point of view of the overseas officer I could quite understand that he had his career to consider. He had joined the Colonial Service under certain conditions and when the amendments that I visualised were made to the existing constitution I could see that in a country on the verge of independence he would not be able to retain the status which was given to him under the old colonial regime. He would be faced with a choice: to leave the country or to surrender his existing terms of appointment under the Colonial Service regulations by joining the Gold Coast service and accepting full local control.

And so I set about planning a Gold Coast local civil service in which these overseas officers could elect to serve if they wanted to. At the same time I knew that this in itself was not enough. Some inducement would have to be offered to make it worth their while to stay, otherwise there would be a general exodus which would not be in the interests of the country. I therefore formed a proposal for compensation for loss of career in order to secure the interest of the officers concerned and to retain their services as long as possible until we were in a position to put through our Africanisation

programme... Our position was unlike that of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, for at the time they achieved independence, all three of these countries had a public service which was largely indigenous (pp. 148-149).

That was surely a show of rare courage to take the initiative **away** from the British as quickly as possible. To hide away from the problem and expect the British to continue to lead the initiative in “preparing” the indigenous African to take over was not an act of courage but a lacklustre exhibition of irresponsibility founded on a dishonest dereliction of national duty. Hence, Dr. Okoampa-Ahoofe’s holding an exception to Dr. Danquah’s behaviour if even defensively. We do not see that compared with Dr. Nkrumah, Dr. Danquah deserves to be carried shoulder high for such exhibitionism.

More so, we should rather hold it against Dr. Busia for his attempt to reverse the wheels of history in the face of all these efforts to forestall what the Republic of Guinea was to go through a year after Dr. Nkrumah had expressed and recorded this wisdom in pragmatism in his Autobiography. No doubt that Dr. Nkrumah was the only African to have understood Guinea’s predicament and speedily helped out.

Clearly then, he was miles ahead of the UGCC fold. His show of singleness of purpose for the speedy attainment of independence in terms of thinking out the strategy of resistance and administrative reforms and pursuing these in action marks him out not only as to his crystal intentions and interest in the independence project but more significantly as its master strategist. Unwavering in his stance and sense of focus, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah singularly mapped out the processes for the progressive realization of a people’s generational dream and quest for self-determination. Such were the attitudes that made Mahatma Gandhi the Father of India.

Prof. Mike Ocquaye, in the presentation cited above, states that the ‘published aims and objects of the NLM [National Liberation Movement] reflected the objectives of the UGCC’. Among them was one which sought ‘To secure due recognition of the economic, social and cultural background of the respective regions of the Gold Coast and work out a federal or any better form of Constitution to give the country an effective voice in the regional and Central Government of the country.’ Commenting on this, he explains that ‘the NLM essentially wanted guarantees to the liberty of the various regions/areas of Ghana’. He calls the principle involved here ‘federalism or regional devolution or any other arrangement that would recognize authority apart from the Centre’. Immediately after this the NLM stated its intention ‘To banish lawlessness, intimidation, hooliganism, disregard for age and authority, suppression of individual conscience and all traces of communism’.

It is important to pick up the essential ideological thread that held and continues to hold these assertions together if we are to understand Dr. Kwame Nkrumah’s reaction to them. In this respect, in the thought of the NLM, communism is associated with lawlessness, intimidation, hooliganism, disregard for age and authority and suppression of individual conscience. Built upon a rejection of these ‘traces of communism’ the NLM erected the edifice of regional liberty. And Prof. Ocquaye expresses this regional liberty in equivalence to ‘regional autonomy’. He asserts the need ‘to ensure countervailing authority’. He declares that ‘Our people wanted diffusion of power or countervailing authority...The demand for federalism was a power-sharing cry which came out of suspicion’. And the suspicion arose from the fact that ‘Nkrumah had threatened the chiefs of Ghana and treated them with contempt. He was becoming a socialist despot. Hence, the NLM reared its head led by Baafour Osei Akoto’ who was a Chief Linguist of Asante. Anti-communism thus forges alliance with feudalism.

Prof. Oquaye is not entirely correct in this historical representation. He neglects the important fact that the NLM went beyond an issue of devolution of power and actually agitated for **secession**. That was the 'Mate Me Ho' tragedy. He neglects the fact that the NLM was a regionalist movement that concentrated its efforts within the Asante region. The [Wikipedia](#) entry on the NLM states that "The original aim of this Movement was not to oppose independence of Ghana but to maintain the freedom, the liberty, the tradition and cultural heritage of the Asante Nation." There were other similarly-based organizations like the Northern People's Party, led by Chief S. D. Dombo, and the Togoland Congress. In his autobiography Struggle Against Dictatorship, Baafour Osei Akoto states that "The NLM believed in federalism as the best means of checking abuse of power and dictatorship". It is clear in this light that parochial interests emerged in the pre-1957 era as centrifugal forces. To address them and compel those forces into national rather than regionalist activities Dr. Nkrumah acted.

The secessionist threats were represented by the Togoland Congress that sought to unite the Ewe in the Gold Coast with those in the Trust Territories of Togoland as a [separate country](#), the NLM that sought to achieve an autonomous Asante and the Northern People's Congress that, according to Dr. Mahamadu Bawumia, [had](#) 'the singular purpose of developing the North'. To contain these threats, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah remained on the ground of relying on the mass of the people to win the struggle against federalism in favour of a unitary state through the 1954 and 1956 elections and the 1956 referendum on the question of Trans-Volta/Togoland. With regard to the operation of organizations on tribal and religious lines he had to apply a legislative instrument that compelled the factional entities to assume a national character. How he achieved these ends of aborting the secessionist threats and compelling political and other organizations to operate beyond tribal and ethnic parameters are briefly addressed in this section.

First, the issue of federalism. It is instructive to observe that that issue was not directed against the British. Linking it with 'the communist threat' was a way of co-opting the British colonial administration against the Nkrumah regime in the period before the attainment of independence – similar to what the Fanti Confederation did to the Asante. Dr. Nkrumah had considered the communist 'charge' diversionary enough to warrant a statement on it in the Legislative Assembly to "allay" British fears even before the NLM emerged in later months. Dealing with the issue at a time when he himself did not have enough Marxist socialists or communists to assist him and applying the principle of Tactical Action, he adopted a pragmatic approach of barring **non-existent** communists from assuming positions in the civil service. In Dede Amanor-Wilks' doctoral dissertation, Peasants, Settlers and Weavers in Africa 2006, she attaches an appendix that captures the 1954 statement in the Legislative Assembly. That had freed him from the diversion. We quote Appendix 5 to the dissertation at length thus:

**Prime Minister Nkrumah's statement to the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly,
25 February 1954**

The Prime Minister (Dr Kwame Nkrumah): With your permission, Mr Speaker, I wish to make a statement on the attitude of the Government towards the employment of Communists in the Public Service.

I should like to quote the words which the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (then Mr Attlee) used when addressing the House of Commons on this subject in March 1948. He said:-

Experience, both in this country and elsewhere has shown that membership of, and other forms of continuing association with, the Com-

munist Party may involve the acceptance by the individual of a loyalty, which in certain circumstances can be inimical to the State.

This warning seems to me to apply with even greater force to a young and rising nation like our own. The Government of the Gold Coast will therefore in future refuse to employ, in certain branches of the Public Service, persons who are proved to their satisfaction to be active Communists... [Administrative, Education, Labour, Information Services, Police, Army and Gold Coast Commissioner's Office overseas.]

The Government will not tolerate the employment of public servants who have shown that their first loyalty is to an alien Power or a foreign Agency which seems to bring our country under its domination.

I would also like to add that in recent months foreign organisations have been taking an increasing interest in our affairs, as we approach the goal of self-government. Large quantities of pamphlets and magazines are being sent to this country from abroad. All of it is tendentious, and some of it is designed to stir up trouble which may obstruct or destroy our movement in this country for self-government. Again, certain persons in this country are being given free air passages to attend conferences behind what is generally known as the Iron Curtain, with all expenses paid; and scholarships are being offered for Gold Coast students to attend conferences and seminars organised by Communistic organisations. The Government are taking measures to deal with this aspect of the matter.

In conclusion I should like to emphasise that these measures are being taken solely as a precaution and to protect the security of the Gold Coast, and not on political grounds. The Government do not seek—they have never sought—to dictate to the people what political views they may or may not hold. We believe in freedom of speech and will protect it. But I am sure that hon. Members from all parts of the House will agree that the first loyalty of all of us must be to our own country, and that the Government have the duty to protect our people from the insidious attack of those who, at the very time when we are freeing ourselves from one form of imperialism, seek to undermine and destroy us or to bind us to another which would swiftly undo all the work that has been done in recent years to foster the growth of the Gold Coast as a free and independent nation.

Source: Gold Coast Legislative Assembly Debates. Official Report. 25 February 1954. p.980.

While the seeds of the Non-Alignment Policy can easily be discerned in this statement there is no doubting the fact that it was a politically correct statement to make in the midst of the Cold War and the advantage that the Opposition sought to reap. In fact, after independence and attainment of republican status, to rather address the problem of the **inadequacy** of such 'communists', Dr. Nkrumah created the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute at Winneba where these same civil servants were sent to for retraining in tune with Marxist socialist ideology. At the Institute, Marxist socialists from Africa and elsewhere were the lecturers. For the meantime, in issuing that statement two birds were killed with a stone: the possible British fear allayed and the Opposition device deflated. Upon the emergence of the NLM he had a free hand to deal with the issue of federalism.



Dr. Nkrumah and wife Fathia with Chiefs

The NLM had emerged out of suspicion arising out of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah's threats against chiefs and contempt for them, according to Prof. Ocquaye. Historical accounts by sources sympathetic to the NLM however agree with Dr. Nkrumah's narrative that traces its origins to opposition from farmers to the Cocoa Duty and Development Funds (Amendment) Bill introduced into the Legislative Assembly on August 10th, 1954. In fact, Prof. Ocquaye sees that as 'the immediate cause' of the NLM's formation. During the political campaigns prior to the June 15th, 1954 elections, by the account of the cited Wikipedia [entry](#), the CPP 'had promised to increase the price of cocoa'; but it 're-neged on this promise'. The accounts add that attempts by

the Ashanti Farmers Union 'to have this situation rectified was met with threats of violence, detention and even deportation'. Consequent upon this, 'some disaffected Ashanti Farmers Union members within the Convention People's Party, namely Osei Asibbey and Opanin Tawiah Kusi Ampofo and six others' approached Chief Linguist Baafour Osei Akoto.

On his part, Dr. Nkrumah explains in his [Autobiography](#), Chapter 19, that given the fact that the price of cocoa had risen to a record height due to world market demand having exceeded the supply a proportionate increase in the price paid to the farmers would lead to higher prices for consumer goods and a higher demand for wage and salary increases. This would have affected the Development Plan under way as well as the costs of the Second Development Plan being drawn up. A policy to cater for both the general public and the farmers became necessary. Hence, the Cocoa Bill was passed in the Legislative Assembly after three days of consideration 'with the blessing of the opposition members'. The effect of this was a Government guarantee to pay a certain price whether the world price was higher or lower. Whatever funds accrued from the policy was to be used on expanding the economy, especially agriculture. The initial cocoa farmer reaction was favourable. But remnants of various political parties seized the opportunity to revive agitation against the Government.

The thrust of the agitation was an alleged injustice to the farmer and the attempt 'to convince the people of how much better off they would all be if they managed their own affairs.' According to Dr. Nkrumah, 'At this time allegations were made that the money which the cocoa growers were pouring into the Government coffers was being used in developing the coastal, or Colony region of the country and that Ashanti, which should be deriving most benefit from the money, was being neglected.' It was in this atmosphere that some CPP members of the Ashanti Farmers Union approached the Asantihene's Chief Linguist crying foul. Baafour Osei Akoto seized the opportunity of instigated spontaneity to found and lead the NLM which had been preceded by the short-lived Council for Higher Cocoa Prices formed by those party remnants. The NLM and the Asanteman Council, headed by the Asantehene, thereupon constituted themselves into an opposition that made a federal form of government their *raison d'être*. Dr. Danquah and Dr. Busia later joined it, according to the Wikipedia entry.

A campaign of violence against CPP members followed after



Prof. K. A. Busia

what Dr. Nkrumah calls the NLM's 'purely political campaign' had failed. Concerned that the situation would lead to serious civil disturbance if the CPP members retaliated, Dr. Nkrumah restrained them lest the British, who looked on unconcerned, would declare 'that a country in a state of bordering on civil war was hardly in a fit condition to take charge of its own affairs'. Not the Government but the British had full control over the police and the army. In fact, Dr. Nkrumah says at page 219 of the Autobiography that if those security forces were 'in the hands of my Government, the revolt, disobedience and disregard of law, order and justice in Ashanti would never have happened.' In the circumstance, he rather moved a motion in the Assembly for a Select Committee to examine the question of a federal system and that of a Second Chamber. The Opposition was to be represented by five and the Government by seven; but the Opposition declined participation calling what was about to happen a 'farcical drama'.

The Secretary of State had made a statement to the effect that transfer of power would be delayed until there was a settled atmosphere. The Opposition therefore 'had it fixed in their heads that as long as they disagreed with everything the Government proposed, they would be assured of delaying Independence indefinitely', Dr. Nkrumah says. In the event, however, the Select Committee declined to recommend the proposed federal system and postponed discussion on a Second Chamber till after independence. All the same, Dr. Nkrumah had to move a motion in the Assembly to request the British Government to send a Constitutional Adviser to the Gold Coast to help formulate a new constitution and advise on devolution of regional powers and functions. Sir Frederick Bourne then came. The NLM refused to meet him while he was in Kumasi. Their excuse was based on the new State Councils (Ashanti) Amendment Bill which had made it possible for chiefs to appeal to the Governor against their destoolment by the Asanteman Council. Chiefs opposed to federalism were being destooled then.

Sir Frederick reported to the Governor on December 17th, 1955 in spite of the Opposition boycott. He proposed a consultative and deliberative assembly in each region. Earlier on in the year, the Secretary of State had made it clear to Dr. Nkrumah that unless a substantial majority of the people had demonstrated a desire for independence in the very near future and had agreed on a workable constitution the British Government would hesitate to grant independence. To this end, Dr. Nkrumah suggested a representative Conference to discuss the Bourne Report as well as the form of the constitution. Sir Frederick Bourne was invited to the Conference and all but the NLM and the Asanteman Council even after persuasion by the Joint Provincial Council of Chiefs attended. Due to the NLM's absence the Conference failed to meet the terms of the Secretary of State. Violence continued in Kumasi and arms and ammunition were found in both camps leading to prosecutions in court. In spite of the atmosphere of violence the British insisted on elections being held against Dr. Nkrumah's advice.

The CPP won the elections with 71 out of 104 seats; an independent's support increased it to 72.

Before those July 17th, 1956 elections the question of British Togoland was settled on May 9th, 1956. The problem here was that the Ewe were divided in three portions – those in the Gold Coast, those in British Togoland and those in French Togoland. The Togoland Congress wanted British Togoland separated from the Gold Coast. The CPP wanted the unification of British Togoland with the Gold Coast. The Togoland Congress received the support of all the anti-CPP parties.

British Togoland and French Togoland were together a German Protectorate from 1884 until 1914. On the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, that territory was declared a Trusteeship administered

by both the British in the Gold Coast and the French in Dahomey. The British were to the west and the French were to the east; hence British Togoland and French Togoland. Between 1914 and 1920 most of Eweland was within British Togoland. But in 1920 it was divided between the French and the British.

This division meant that a significant portion of Eweland had become part of French Togoland. Under the previous arrangement – that is, after the dismemberment of the German Protectorate – the British administered virtually the entire Eweland, part as a Trusteeship and part as a dependency together with and within the Gold Coast. Only a tiny portion was in French Togoland. The 1920 division changed the situation and the Ewe were significantly divided officially into the three parts.

Dr. Kwame Nkrumah observes that exercise as ‘splitting up homogeneous tribes by international frontiers as if one were cutting a cake’ (*Autobiography*, p. 260). To address this anomaly an All-Ewe Conference was formed by the Ewe to agitate for the removal of all international frontiers separating Eweland. At the United Nations both the British and the French admitted that the positions of the Conference were those of the mass of the Ewe people.

But rather than leaving the issue of Ewe unification to be decided by the people themselves in a plebiscite the British introduced a complication that delayed determination. They made it clear at the United Nations that the discussion of Ewe in the Trust Territory should not involve a discussion of the Ewe in the Gold Coast. In the spirit of divide and rule, the British stated that the Gold Coast was not a Trust Territory and as such the Ewe therein could not be brought into the Trusteeship question.

From 1920, therefore, the British consistently pursued a policy of Ewe disunity and a freezing of that disunity. Dr. Nkrumah observes that if the pre-1920 arrangement had remained the Togoland problem might not have arisen. In the circumstance, he was determined to have a united country including Trans-Volta/Togoland. To achieve this, he played the independence card with the insistence that ‘the whole question should be viewed from the angle of freedom and independence’ (*ibid.*).

In pursuit of this, he impressed upon the British Government the necessity of linking the Togoland question with Gold Coast independence in a statement at the United Nations. The British swallowed the bait. That statement on the future of British Togoland was made at the UN in 1954. According to Dr. Nkrumah’s narrative ‘the British Government pointed out that when the Gold Coast achieved independence, Her Majesty’s Government would no longer be in a position to continue to administer Togoland under United Kingdom administration as an integral part of the Gold Coast’ (*ibid.* p. 261).

In addition, ‘the British Government suggested that the objectives of the Trusteeship agreement would be achieved if Togoland attained self-government as an integral part of an independent Gold Coast’. In consequence of this, a UN mission visited British Togoland in August, 1955. Consequent upon the mission’s report, a plebiscite was decided to be held there for the people themselves to decide whether to unite with the Gold Coast at the time of independence or to remain under Trusteeship in separation from the Gold Coast.

Dr. Nkrumah’s commitment to unification with the Gold Coast is stated unequivocally thus: ‘I had never for one minute contemplated excluding that part of Togoland under United Kingdom administration from my political organisation of the Gold Coast, for it was my aim to bring about a united country embracing all four regions – the Northern Territories, Ashanti, the Colony and Trans-Volta/Togoland.’ To this end, he set the CPP machinery in Togoland at work to make sure that the people understood the issues at stake. The result favoured union in the plebiscite.

The effect of the plebiscite was the incorporation of the greater part of Eweland **formally** into the Gold Coast. That area includes the site of the Akosombo Dam that provides hydro-electricity to Ghana in the main and the Republic of Togo. Dr. Nkrumah's pressure on the British and pursuit of a united country not only configured Ghana as is in its geography and topography but also brought the larger portion of a dismembered ethnic entity together. The NLM and other opposition parties had supported the separation of British Togoland from the Gold Coast. Could they found Ghana as it is?

The second issue, apart from the one on secessionism or separatism, which Dr. Kwame Nkrumah had to address, was the question of sectarianism as in terms of tribalism, ethnicism and religious parochialism. The National Liberation Movement, the Northern People's Party, the Anlo Youth Organization, the Muslim Association Party and the Togoland Congress were all either regionally or religiously based. At a point, Dr. Nkrumah sounded disturbed and worried when he said:

What I cannot understand is why these opposition parties don't get together and use their energy in a more constructive and effective way by forming themselves into a **nationwide** opposition party, instead of racking their brains for ways and means of overthrowing the party in power and believing that the dynamiting of the houses of our party members would be as final in its destruction as that of a child's sand castle knocked down in a fit of rage by a fellow playmate (emphasis added). (See Peter Kofi Amponsah's article 'Kwame Nkrumah and the Development of Democratic Rule-of-Law State in Ghana'.)

It is sufficient to state here that in the very first year of independence he resolved this situation with the passage of The Avoidance of Discrimination Act (1957), which 'outlawed parties based on racial, regional, or religious differences'. That created the grounds compelling these parties to unite as the United Party (UP). Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia became its leader.

That Act, Kwesi Pratt points out, created the United Party. It virtually forced the splinters of opposition parties to gather to create a semblance of a national front. This fact remains an embarrassment to persons like Prof. Oquaye who avoids a single reference to the **United Party** in his presentation. Rather than trace the origins of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) to the **nationally** based UP he continues to talk of the **regionalist** NLM. Ironically, when it comes to references to the NPP's **tradition** he talks of a 'Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradition' which could be traced to the UP but not the NLM. This deep-seated nostalgia for the NLM is linked to an anxiety to bury NPP's historical origins from the **Act**. The point is that that tradition, apart from the Nkrumah interregnum, has always been regionalist in spirit.

By Prof. Oquaye's [calculation](#), 'The Danquah-Busia-Dombo Tradition has only governed for ten years and three months out of 57 years.' In spite of this period in power, the Tradition never abrogated The Avoidance of Discrimination Act although some of its representatives, who ever dare to speak on the issue, condemn it as a mark of Dr. Nkrumah's dictatorial tendencies directed at muzzling the opposition. Whatever adverse motives are attributed to the Act it stands the test of time as all Constitutions after the Nkrumah Regime, including the 1969 Constitution that Prof. Oquaye claims the credit for the Tradition, have retained the philosophy underscoring it. Sectarianism in national life continues to suffer an uneasy existence in the Ghanaian political psyche since Dr. Nkrumah injected the Act into it.

In our research, we came across the piece 'This Haste for a Republic: Address Delivered Under the Auspices of the United Party at the Palladium, Accra, on February 26, 1960' by Dr. J. B. Danquah. We could not have access to its content. And without access to the content of that Address, therefore, it might be unfair to pretend to be analysing it here. Whatever the content is, however, the title at once conveys a message of anxiety about the pace at which the pursuit of a republican status for Ghana was going. Of course, being in haste about everything concerning Ghana and Africa remained a defining characteristic of Dr. Nkrumah till his demise. He had always said that what it took other countries centuries to achieve a newly independent country must take just a decade or so to accomplish.

The Danquah-Busia-Dombo Tradition was certainly fabricated by persons who were either members of a feudal royalty or aligned to it. Of the five leading members of the British-created Big Six belonging to the UGCC, that is, Dr. J. B. Danquah, William Ofori Atta, Edward Akuffo-Addo, Dr. Ako Adjei and Obetsebi Lamptey, the first three were related to the Akyemhene, Sir Nana Ofori Atta I, of Akyem Abuakwa. Chief S. D. Dombo, on the other hand, was effectively a Chief of Duori in the Upper West Region of Ghana. The NLM, to which some of these belonged, was founded and led by the Chief Lin-



Sir Nana Osei Tutu Agyeman Prempeh II greeting British Premier Harold MacMillan

guist of the [Asantehene](#), Sir Nana Osei Tutu Agyeman Prempeh II, head of the Asanteman Council which was in alliance with the NLM in the pursuit of federalism. These British-knighted Kings were nice to the British.

Certainly, if these personalities were not in haste Dr. Kwame Nkrumah truly was. On the day, July 1st 1960, when Ghana was born as a Republic he addressed the nation and proclaimed that with the birth of the Republic 'the end of its struggle for freedom' had not only been brought about but also that

Our plan therefore must be to build up industries, heavy and basic, and to diversify and mechanise our agriculture, and we must do this with the **utmost speed**, if we are not to be overtaken by events. The pace at which the world travels today is so **fast** that no loafer-nations can survive the rate of change. That is why our nation must throw in everything into this economic and social revolution and make sure that Ghana comes out a winner (emphases added). (Samuel Obeng, [Selected Speeches of Kwame Nkrumah](#), Vol. 1, p. 88.)

In these words on the first Republic Day, he explained that, one, the struggle for freedom had **now** been completely achieved; and, two, that the pace of development in the world was so **fast** that building the economy required **utmost speed**. Certainly, whoever complained of haste to consummate one's freedom must either be prepared to continue to live at least a little longer in incomplete freedom and servitude and therefore continue under foreign sovereignty or be in ignorance of the exigencies of the times. Only the spirit of **gbeshie** could inflict such a mental disposition on one who claimed to be working to achieve freedom 'in the shortest possible time'.

Of course, Dr. Kwame Okoampa-Ahoofe, after claiming all policies implemented by Dr. Nkrumah as Dr. Danquah's initiatives within the Gold Coast Youth Conference, finds it debateable that the UGCC had Dr. Nkrumah's sense of urgency for the implementation of those policies. Once again, we quote from his article in reference thus: 'It may, however, be legitimately debated regarding whether had the UGCC rather than Nkrumah's CPP, ushered the Gold Coast into its glorious era of sovereignty, the implementation of the preceding policies might have been accorded the same urgency in deployment afforded by the Nkrumah government.'

Probably, Dr. Nkrumah was responding to the possible objection to haste when he said in that nationwide broadcast that 'Real and genuine independence must ... precede the attainment of ... aim. For this we are sure that the current now flowing is strongly in the direction of **absolute liberty**. Those African leaders who are attempting to **temporise** by arranging behind the backs of their people undercover links with the former Colonial Powers will surely fail. For, the force of the mass movement towards freedom will not tolerate reactionary and double-dealing politicians (op. cit. p. 89).' On July 30th 1960, as if in answer, again, to the UP fold, he had addressed Parliament and stated:

Mr. Speaker, we have adopted a Republican Constitution not through any lack of affection for Her Majesty, nor because of any dissatisfaction with the way in which the Office of Governor General has been discharged.

The people of Ghana have enacted for themselves a new Constitution because of our convictions that we need a form of Government which will more truly interpret the aspirations and hopes of the people of Ghana and give full expression to the African personality (op. cit. p. 85).

Whatever then might have propelled the United Party to talk about haste in achieving republican



**Dr. Nkrumah with Queen Elizabeth II
in 1961**

status – be it a device to indicate their fawning affection for the feudal head of the British Empire or something else – Dr. Kwame Nkrumah proved to be the architect of Ghana's republican status without an expression of hatred for the United Kingdom and in spite of opposition thoughts concerning timing. Dr. Busia had protested against the timing of the 'grant' of independence. Dr. Danquah appeared to have also complained about the timing for republican status. In both cases, the UP did not exercise the initiative. Truly, independence and republican status were fought for but not simply granted.

Conclusions

Prof. Mike Ocquaye asserts in the paper he delivered at the New Patriotic Party's 21st anniversary lecture on August 22, 2013 that 'The seed was duly sown. And Nkrumah was not only physically in the UK, but also he made no input whatsoever. Nkrumah came and added bountifully to it. And Nkrumah was a great man. But he was not in Ghana when it all started. Nkrumah was not the Founder! Danquah conceived the idea of calling the independent Gold Coast, Ghana.' Compared with Dr. J. B. Danquah's historico-legal analysis, 'The Historical Significance of the Bond of 1844', (1957), Prof. Ocquaye's paper stands in manifest inferiority bordering on mediocrity not only in methodology but also in presentation of facts.

The Watson Commission, in its investigation of the 1948 riots, did not only collect oral evidence from those arrested. It scrutinized, as well, important UGCC documents such as the Minute Book of its Working Committee and The Circle Document found in Dr. Kwame Nkrumah's possession. It concluded in its report that 'From the internal evidence of the Minute Book of the Working Committee, the Convention did not really get down to business until the arrival of Mr. Kwame Nkrumah on 16th December, 1947, and his assumption of the post as Secretary'. Dr. Nkrumah confirms this in his book Autobiography to the effect that he found only a couple of inactive branches upon arrival.

Furthermore, Dr. Danquah himself traces the origin of the liberation struggle not to the date when he was supposed to have 'conceived the idea of calling the independent Gold Coast, Ghana' but to the reaction of the people against the illegality of the British Proclamation of 1874 when he had not yet been born. He was born twenty-one years later. In fact, 'the seed was duly sown' *actively* by the struggles of the chiefs and people in their resistance against British attempts to take over their land. This resistance in the streets from 1894, a year before Dr. Danquah was born, led to the emergence of the Aborigines Rights Protection Society which formalized the struggle in *legalistic* forms.

In asserting the bountiful nature of Dr. Nkrumah's contribution to the UGCC's work, Prof. Ocquaye fails to consider the qualitative dimensions of that contribution as well. Quantitatively, Dr. Nkrumah expanded the couple of inactive branches to over five hundred active ones in the Colony proper alone within six months and further across the country to all corners of the then existing four regions. Qualitatively, Dr. Nkrumah, by design, injected a new and contrary ideological content into the mobilization and organizational effort. In so doing, he followed the contrasting programme of the secret vanguard organization of professional revolutionaries, The Circle, directed at West African unity, liberation and socialism. In that event, he consciously created something different from what the UGCC had invited him to do.

Realization of this ideological difference on the part of the other leaders of the UGCC inaugurated a spate of informal efforts to prove Dr. Nkrumah's communist inclination. These informal activities led the said leaders to branch offices where their hostility towards Dr. Nkrumah came to the knowledge of branch executives. Subsequent acts of demotion against him and plans to dismiss him from the party led to pressures from the rank and file of the party on him to resign. This turn of events had long been anticipated by Dr. Nkrumah himself before his return home from the UK and he had not only worked himself into creating conditions for the moment of parting of ways but also consciously organ-

ized the movement in such a way as to carry the masses along with him at that crucial moment. The leaders played into his game plan.

Once Dr. Nkrumah had exited from the UGCC together with the mass membership into the new Convention People's Party the ideological differences played out big. The manifesto of the CPP for the crucial 1956 elections demanded of the voter to address two questions: 'Do I want independence in my life-time?' and 'Do I want to revert to feudalism and imperialism?' The leadership of the NLM and the Northern People's Party (NPP) was then made up of persons who were either associated with the feudal institution of chieftaincy or were themselves chiefs. And mass beliefs about the collaboration of the chiefs linked to the NLM-NPP with the colonial administration associated feudalism with imperialism to the NLM-NPP's disadvantage.

Disaffected members of the CPP, arising out of election candidate nomination issues and difficulties with cocoa pricing policies, had respectively emerged as the Northern People's Party and the NLM. These and others like the Togoland Congress teamed up against the CPP on issues of opposition demands for a federal constitution and separation of British Togoland from the Gold Coast. On all these issues, Dr. Nkrumah led the CPP to win the battle for a unitary system of government against the demand for federalism as well as the incorporation of the British Togoland Trusteeship into independent Ghana against opposition support for a separate British Togoland Trusteeship.

And once independence was achieved in 1957 with a British Governor General still at the head of state as the representative of the Queen of the United Kingdom, all that was left was a Republican Constitution to complete the struggle for independence. After three years of independence, the UP still felt that attainment of the republican status in 1960 was rather hasty. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah thought otherwise. He constructed the Republican Constitution of 1960 which was endorsed and passed by Parliament. That Constitution did not only found Ghana as a Republic but also permitted the Republic to dissolve itself in the event of an African Continental Republican State emerging.

Hence, in the annals of Ghana's history when one talks of the founding of the State as a **unitary, republican** and **independent** entity **embracing the British Togoland Trust Territory** only one name is visible: Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. On each of these structures he stood alone among all the country's politicians. Prof. Evans Atta Mills was indeed not historically mistaken, therefore, in pronouncing him as The Founder of Ghana. In the face of such documented facts of history how does it sound to hear Prof. Mike Ocquaye ejaculate thus: 'Nkrumah was not the Founder of Ghana. The progenitors of the NPP founded Ghana and Nkrumah who had been invited by these unsung heroes, became one of the Founding Fathers by courtesy of that invitation'? A clean disrespect for and distortion of history!

It is only left that the current Parliament, with Prof. Mills' party in the majority, quickly and decisively endorses this in the appropriate legislative instrument. Else Prof. Mike Ocquaye will carry out his threat to distort history further *a la* this confused emission:

... you do not have to be a founder for your greatness to be recognized or given a holiday. Martin Luther King (USA) is an example. Nkrumah may be honoured with a holiday as First Prime Minister and first President. He also did a lot for Ghana regarding education, health, Akosombo Dam, Tema motorway etc. But we should have a real Founders' Day to honour ALL the real founding fathers, including Nkrumah. **The next NPP government must see to this.** (Emphasis added).

In that event, Prof. Ocquaye should rest assured that a veritable guerrilla war shall be conjured into existence to put things right. For, if he recognizes that 'you do not have to be a founder for your greatness to be recognized' why does he insist on **unqualified** persons to be recognized as founders when their possible greatness in their legal and/or professorial practice could be assessed and awarded in recognition as such? Why flout Dr. Danquah's historiographic criterion for the determination of a founder? Why this *morborful* fruitless attempt to claim unearned honours? This *gbeshie* syndrome! *E yé gbeyee!*

VI

Limitations of this Paper

The present paper has not sought to delve into the demands of the Fanti Confederation to determine what the chiefs' concerns and [assumptions](#) about the political situation were in 1868. That would have thrown light on how an African had become a member of the **Legislature**, a political institution, in 1850, only six years after the Bond of 1844 was signed – that is, if the Bond was a document dealing with just a juridical link between the Fanti and the British Crown.

Likewise, it has not delved into the [concerns and attitudes](#) of the Aborigines Rights Protection Society (1898) which investigation would have helped us understand the growing imposition of British imperial rule on the basis of antecedents consequent upon the declaration of the Bond. Notwithstanding these limitations, Dr. J. B. Danquah's criterion for the determination of a founder remains valid and all-abiding as a historiographic principle for the apportionment of credit.

Some papers and articles could not be accessed in full. This made it difficult to let them impact significantly here. For instance, in the absence of direct access to the Minute Book of the UGCC we could have benefited much from Dennis Austin's 'Working Committee of the UGCC' article. Dr. J. B. Danquah's 'This Haste for a Republic Address' would have served a great purpose if we had had access to its contents.

We are, however, comforted by the fact that books consulted contained much primary materials that stand superior to those papers and articles. This does not prevent us from acknowledging that dependence on secondary source materials takes a little shine from the weight of opinions expressed.

It is our hope that subsequent access to all the materials missed would help us revise this text with the view to adding unto the weight of analytical judgements made herein.

Finally, though this is not intended as an academic or a scholarly piece we have made attempts to respect certain academic usages without sacrificing our Marxist-Nkrumaist partisanship. And there is no suggestion of regret here; for, we are yet to agree that the search for knowledge has nothing to do with how we would like to see the form and content that the world of human societies and their environmental dependents assume.

Every writer is a partisan. More especially for those of us who aspire to be professional revolutionaries in the make of Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and even better.

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